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INTRODUCTION

The medical payments provision of the automobile liability policy
affords payment to certain persons, regardless of fault, for reasonable
medical expenses incurred within one year. Medical payments coverage
was first offered to the public in 1939 as an endorsement to automobile
liability insurance policies.' In the 1930's there had been considerable
agitation for some form of no-fault compensation for victims of auto-

' Note, Insurance-Medical Payments Coverage In Automobile Liability Policies,
1955 Wis. L. REv. 483, 484-85;
§ 8.01, at 8-1 -8-2 (Supp. 1969).

R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
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mobile accidents. 2 The insurance industry responded with the medical
payments provision. The existence of guest statutes and intra-familial
immunity were other reasons for the appearance of this first party insurance.
Thirty years after the introduction of medical payments coverage
the automobile insurance industry and the tort system are again being
attacked by no-fault advocates. The medical payments provision is
viewed as the precursor of a much more encompassing automobile
insurance plan which, if accepted, would have a profound effect on the
very moral power of this nation. The authors of the best known of
these plans, Professors Keeton and O'Connell, have said that their proposed system is: "[A] form of compulsory motor vehicle insurance
closely comparable to the medical payments coverage of present automobile policies." 3 This article was prepared partly because of the new
importance being given to medical payments coverage, and because,
after thirty years of experience, it is now possible to collect, collate and
analyze the law interpreting the application of this short and seemingly
simple provision. The analysis which follows demonstrates that first
party coverage can give rise to numerous disputes and litigation. Therefore, advocates of expansion of these benefits and changes in the coverages must consider the legal precedent which has interpreted the medical payments provision for the past thirty years.
The object of this article is the examination of the meaning and
scope of coverage in the medical payments provision of the Personal
and Family Combination Automobile Insurance Policy. The discussion
focuses on the coverage, exclusions, other insurance clause, limits of
liability and policy conditions. Extended treatment is given to that
language which is both peculiar to the medical payments provision and
which has been the subject of litigation. Problems incident to the automobile policy in general are discussed summarily or not at all. Each
significant clause of the policy is quoted either in the text or in a footnote as it is discussed. To give the reader an overview of the provision,
Part II of a Personal and a Family Combination Policy has been reproduced in appendices at page 513.
II. COVERAGE
A. INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH OF THE PROVISION
The introductory paragraph of the medical payments provision will
be discussed first. A standard wording has developed.
2See, e.g., the "Columbia Plan," the ancestor of almost all present day no-

fault plans.

COLUMBIA UurvRsrny CouNcIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES, REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE To STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS 138 (1932).
3 R. KEETON & J. O'CoNN.L, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VcTim 268

(1965). See also 273-4 and 7: "Basic protection coverage is a new form of
automobile insurance; most of its features, however, are derived from types
of insurance already in use, medical payments coverage of current policies
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Coverage C - Medical Services. To pay all reasonable expenses
incurred within one year from the date of accident for necessary
medical, surgical, X-ray and dental services, including prosthetic
devices, and necessary ambtalance, hospital, professional nursing
and funeral services: . . .4
1. Incurred
The provision stipulates that the insurer must "pay all reasonable
expenses incurred within one year from the date of accident." 5 The
first word to be analyzed is "incurred." Difficulty with this single word
has arisen in two major areas: (1) claims involving servicemen; and
(2) claims involving insureds who are also covered by hospital plans.
The further concept of incurrence within one year will be discussed
in the following section.
a. Servicemen. In Gordon v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New
York,6 a career soldier was struck by an automobile while he was
riding a motor scooter. He was hospitalized- in the government hospital at Fort Jackson. The-soldier brought an action against his automobile medical payments insurer for the reasonable cost of his hospitalization. The South Carolina Supreme Court, relying upon other
cases which had construed the word "incurred" in other types of
policies,7 held that there was no ambiguity and that: "There being no
obligation on the part of the respondent to pay for the hospitalization
he received at Fort Jackson hospital, he 'incurred' no expense within
the meaning of the provision of the policy of insurance issued by the
appellant."" ,
A similar case is Irby v. Government Employees Insurance Co.9
The plaintiff, injured while on active duty with the Coast Guard, was
not allowed to recover under the medical payments provision of his
policy for the reasonable value of medical and hospital services which
the closest analogy." At another point the authors speak of "Basic Protection" as "a prudent extension of the principle of medical payments coverage."
4Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Services; Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Payments. Throughout
this article the Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Company Personal Automobile
Policy and the Northwestern National Insurance Group Family Combination
Automobile Policy will be referred to as examples. The texts of the medical
payments provisions of these policies are printed in the appendices. It has
been estimated that over 80% of those insureds who purchase automobile
liability insurance have voluntarily purchased medical payments coverage.
Address by Andre Maisonpierre, Independent Mutual Insurance Agents of
New York Meeting, Sept., 1968.
5 Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Services; Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Payments.
6 238 S.C. 438, 120 S.E.2d 509 (1961).
7Drearr v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 119 So. 2d 149 (La. Ct. App. 1960)
(veteran with policy for expense incurred for hospital charges and services) ;
United States v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 238 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1956)
(veteran with poliomyelitis policy).
8 120 S.E.2d at 513.
9175 So. 2d 9 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
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he had received at a government hospital. The court relied on the same
cases that the Gordon court had cited but, curiously, did not mention
the Gordon case itself. 10 It was stressed that the word "incurred" emphasizes the idea of liability," 91 and that: "[P]laintiff never was under
any obligation to pay the medical and hospital expenses and therefore
never 'incurred' the same; the defendant [therefore] cannot be forced
2
to pay under its contract."'
American Indemnity Co. v.Olesijuk,13 is one of two other cases in
which the serviceman did recover. A Navy physician was treated by
non-governmental hospitals and doctors. He was then "reimbursed"
under a federal statute applicable when such treatment is "not available
from a Federal source."'1 4 The plaintiff was allowed to recover under
the medical payments provision because :, "The fact that the insured has
other arrangements for the reimbursement of his expenses does not
operate to relieve appellant of its obligation as expressed in its contract
in plain,, certain and unambiguous Jlanguage.' ' 15 The court was apparently impressed by the difference in the route the money took to get
to the serviceman. In Irby the relevant federal statute spoke in terms
of an "entitlement" to payment,"6 rather than a reimbursement, but the
statute was not there discussed. The court in Olesijuk distinguished
cases like Irby as involving "free" service.' 7 Walsh v. Grange Mutual
Casualty Co.,' 8 also involved a federal statute using the word "reim-

bursed." Relying heavily on Olesijuk, the court allowed the estate of
the decedent serviceman to recover under the decedent's medical payments provision for funeral expenses which had been paid for in part
by the government.
The exact wording of the applicable federal statute must be examined in order to predict the result of a case in which a serviceman
has received medical treatment without cost and then attempts to recover under the medical payments provision. This language may be
determinative. The legal question may be whether there has been "reimbursment" or whether the services have been "free" and the payment
"direct."'

9

Veterans may have similar difficulties with the proof of "incur1o Id. at 10; see Gordon v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 238 S.C. 438, 120 S.E2d
509 (1961).
11175 So. 2d at 10.
12 Id.at 11.
13 353 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
14 [Emergency Medical Treatment: reimbursement for expensel
10 U.S.C.
§ 6203 (1964).
15 353 S.W.2d at 73.
10

Medical services to Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey, and Public
Health Service; examination of personnel of Service assigned to Coast Guard
or Coast and Geodetic Survey,] 42 U.S.C. § 253 (1964).

17 353 S.W.2d at 73.
18 1 Ohio App. 2d 304, 204 N.E.2d 690 (1964).

19 Heis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 248 Ore. 636, 436 P.2d 550, 551 (1968).
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rence." In State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fuller,20 a veteran was
treated in a Veterans Administration Hospital, but only after verifying
her inability to pay for such treatment. The insured-veteran later recovered against the tortfeasor. When a claim was made by the Veterans
Administration, she paid for her treatment. The insurer argued that
the expenses were not incurred. The court held for the insured for two
reasons. One was that: "[J]ust as soon as Mrs. Fuller became able
to pay her cost . . . she did so . .. and at this point the said medical
expenses were, in fact, 'incurred' by appellee [Mrs. Fuller] .... 21

The second basis, theoretical and closely tied to the language of the
medical payments provision, was derived from Kopp v. Home Mutual
Insurance Co. 2 2 Kopp is the lead case on the word "incurred" as it
applies to hospital plans. The policies often read: "To pay all reasonable expense incurred . . . To or for the named insured .... -23 In
the Fuller case the court held that the federal government incurred
the hospital costs. 24 There was incurrence for the insured. The court

hinted that this treatment by the federal government was really part
of the compensation to the veteran for serving in the armed forces and
was not free.2 5 This argument was brought up in a later case and could
be used for the insured in those cases in which the federal statute is
26
phrased in terms of an entitlement.
b. Hospital Plans. The second area of contention involving the
word "incurred" has arisen in cases in which the insured was protected
by a hospital plan in addition to his medical payments coverage. In
the lead case, Kopp v. Home Mutual Insurance Co., 27 the plaintiff, who

had medical payments coverage, was a subscriber to the Blue Cross
Hospital Benefit Plan. He paid a quarterly premium. The plaintiff received hospital services free of charge at a so-called "affiliated" hospital. Blue Cross then reimbursed the affiliated hospital. The automobile insurance company defendant argued that had it been an "unaffiliated" hospital, (1) the plaintiff would have paid the bill and (2)
Ark. 329, 336 S.W.2d 60 (1960); Criterion Ins. Co. v. Starkes, 249 Md.
694, 241 A.2d 707 (1968) (similar principles discussed; the inability to pay
question).
21 336 S.W.2d at 63.
22 6 Wis. 2d 53, 94 N.W.2d 224 (1959).
22 Milwaukee Mut. Ins Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Services and Division 1;
Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Payments and
Division 1.
24 336 S.W2d at 63.
20232

25/d.
2
6Heis

v. Allstate Ins. Co., 248 Ore. 636, 436 P.2d 550, 553 n.4 (1968). But ef.
Rubin v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co., CCH Atrro. INs. L. REP. § 6227 (N.Y. App.
Div. April 10, 1969) (held that it would be unjust enrichment to allow plaintiff, injured while in the course of his employment and the recipient of employer's compensation benefits covering all of his medical expenses, to recover under his medical payments provision for those same expenses, even
though the medical payments provision was not subject to a workmen's compensation exclusion).
27 6 Wis. 2d 53, 94 N.W.2d 224 (1959).
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the plaintiff would have been reimbursed by Blue Cross and that this
would have constituted an incurrence within the terms of the policy.
It was argued that under the facts of the case (ie., an "affiliated" hospital) there was no expense incurred by the plaintiff. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin held that such a distinction, which apparently is
effective in the' servicemen cases, "would lead to a highly absurd and
socially undesirable result." 28 The court was impressed by the fact that
in both cases the consideration given by the insured is the same, a
premium. The court conceded that the plaintiff had incurred no debt.
However, a debt was incurred on the part of Blue Cross to
pay such expense to Luther Hospital, and the plaintiff had paid
quarterly premiums to Blue Cross as consideration for Blue
Cross [sic] undertaking so to do. Thus expense was incurred
for hospital services furnished "to or for" the plaintiff insured.
The . . . policy provisions do not state who is required to

incur the expense in order for the insured to 29recover for medical
or hospital services supplied to or for him.
Since the policy was found ambiguous, the court, following the wellknown rule of construction, held for the plainliff.
Three cases involving a plan similar to Blue Cross have all relied
on the Kopp case and held for the insured. 30 These cases have added
very little to the rationale of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. They did
suggest that there might be an opposite result if the medical payments
provision was drafted in a manner similar to the typical Bodily Injury
and Property Damage coverages. Those provisions obligate the insurer
to pay on behalf of the insured sums which the insured shall become
legally obligated to pay.
In summary, the distinction which prevails in the servicemen cases
betwveen free (direct) services and reimbursement has not been accepted by courts dealing with hospital plans. It should be mentioned,
however, that none of the four hospital plan cases involved the reimbursement fact situation.
c. Incur Does Not Mean Pay For. In Collins v. FarmersInsurance
Exchange,31 the plaintiff had doctor and hospital bills of $5,000. He
compromised these debts for $2,250. The defendant insurer, which had
denied the insured's claim, argued that the insured had incurred expenses of $2,250 rather than $5,000. The Minnesota Supreme Court
did not want to encourage insurers to deny meritorious insurance
28 Id. at 57, 94 N.W.2d at 226.
29 Id. at 56-57, 94 N.W.2d at 225-26; see Nagy v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,

100 R.I. 734, 219 A.2d 396 (1966), where the insured was allowed to recover

for obligations incurred on behalf of another; see also Feit v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 209 Cal. App. 2d 825, 27 Cal. Rptr. 870, 871 (1962).
30 Heis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 248 Ore. 636, 436 P.2d 550 (1968) ; Masaki v. Columbia Cas. Co., 48 Hawaii 136, 395 P.2d 927 (1964); Feit v. St. Paul Fire &
Majine Ins. Co., 209 Cal. App. 2d 825, 27 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1962).

31271 Minn. 239, 135 N.W.2d 503 (1965).
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claims because of the insurer's hope that the insured would settle his
liabilities. The court awarded the insured $5,000, stating: "The definition of incur is 'to become liable for,' as distinguished from actually
'pay for.' "32 Although the word "incurred" can give rise to many legal
difficulties, it is even more difficult to construe the meaning of the
phrase "incurred within one year."
2. Incurred Within One Year
The medical payments provision encompasses payment for "all
reasonable expenses incurred within one year from the date of accident .

.

. -33 It does not cover all expenses arising out of the accident.

The "within one year" language is analogous to those policy limits
which are expressed in dollars.3 4 The difficulty with the phrase occurs
when medical treatment cannot be fully performed within one year.
The lead case is Maryland Casualty Co. v. Thomas.3 5 A nine year
old boy had received serious damage to his teeth, necessitating a permanent bridge. At that age it was not possible to attach the bridge because the child still had baby teeth. The father solicited estimates of
the cost of long range treatment from several doctors. Within one year
from the date of the accident he accepted one of the estimates and paid
it in full. The insurer argued that it was not liable because the repairs
were not performed within one year from the date of the accident. The
court accepted the argument of the plaintiff that: "[T]he language of
the policy makes no requirement as to when the services for repairs
must or may be performed. . .

."36

All of the cases found have allowed

the insurer to recover when he has prepaid. Clearly, if the insured is
37
able, he should prepay, i.e., pay in advance within the one year period.
The fact situation in Thomas was substantially duplicated in Hoehner
v. Western Casualty and Surety Co. 3 8 The court there suggested that

the insurer could protect itself by requiring explicitly in the policy that
the actual "treatment or services" must be performed within the one
year period.3 9 This case involved premises insurance with a medical
payments provision very similar to that of the automobile liability
policy. The court phrased its conclusion more broadly than the facts
required. It held that the insured would prevail if he has: "[C] ontracted
32

135 N.W.2d at 507.

SMMilwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Payments; North-

western Nat'l Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Payments.
34 Reliance Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Booher, 166 So. 2d 222 (Fla. Ct. App.
1964).
35 289 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
38 Id. at 654.
s7What if the work was done within the one year period, but the bill was not
received by the insurance company until after that period? One source said,
"I don't think that any company would quarrel over receipt of a bill shortly
after the end of the period of one year . .. ." THE FORUm 27 (McCormick
& Clapp eds. 1966).
38 8 Mich. App. 708, 155 N.W.2d 231 (1967).
39 155 N.W.2d at 236.
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to pay a sum certain .. .within the year . . .although the services
might be postponed beyond the year in the wisdom of the treating
physician or dentist."4 0 Other cases have also held that prepayment
4
constitutes expenses incurred within one year."'
The real difficulty lies in determining how much less than actual
prepayment will be sufficient. No cases were found in which a sum
certain was decided upon but not paid in advance. Neither were any
cases found in which the insured paid by note. In Reliance Mutual Life
Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Booher4 2 the plaintiff within one year engaged the services of a surgeon to perform reconstructive surgery.
The fees of the surgeon were not agreed upon at that time. The court
held, in effect, that the insured had not come close enough to payment
inadvance:
An expense is the same as a debt, and it has been incurred when
liability for payment attaches. A contingent expense has been
incurred when the contingency upon which the payment depends
has occurred. . . . The plaintiff's engagement of the services
of the surgeon for his future services constituted a contingent
promise to pay for his services, and the expense was not incurred until the contingency4 3occurred, which was the surgeon's
performance of the services.
In the Booher case, the first of a series of operations had been performed within the requisite period. The insured was allowed those expenses. Two New York cases seem to indicate that the commencement
of services within one year, even absent prepayment or a definite contract with the physician, is sufficient to make the insurer liable for all
ensuing medical services, regardless of the date of performance. 44 The
reports of both cases are short and somewhat unclear. Nevertheless,
they represent the most favorable interpretation of the medical payments coverage for the insured.
Finally, the case of Czarnecki v. American Indemnity Co.,4 5 pro40 Id.

Drobne v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 66 Ohio L. Abs. 1, 115 N.E.2d 589 (1953?).
(The court encouraged a charge to the jury containing three elements:. (I)
A contract to perform services, (2) The plaintiff must be bound to pay and
must pay within one year, (3) The doctor must comply with the contract.)
Czarnecki v. American Indem. Co., 259 N.C. 718, 131 S.E.2d 347 (1963).
42 166 So. 2d 222, (Fla. Ct. App. 1964). The policy in this case read: "incurred
within 52 weeks." The difference in language is not material.
43 Id. at 224. The court cited and relied, on three cases, inter alia, not involving
medical payments coverage but discussing similar problems: (1) Herold v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 77 S.W2d 1060 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); (2) Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Stephens, 97 Ga. App. 529, 103 S.W.2d 651 (1958); (3) Kirchoff
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 19 App. Div. 2d, 241 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1963).
44 Whittle v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 Misc. 2d 498, 273 N.Y.S.2d
442 (App. T. 1966) (dental services commenced within one year could not
be completed within one year) ; Perullo v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 Misc. 2d 303,
282 N.Y.S2d 830 (Dist. Ct. 1967) (diagnosis made and treatment arranged
for within one year).
45 259 N.C. 718, 131 S.E.2d 347 (1963).
4'
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vided two rather unsurprising insights. First, the North Carolina Supreme Court overruled the trial court which had held the "within one
year" limitation invalid. The court held that there was no "stafute in
the exercise of the police power" which required it to hold that all
expenses relate back to the time of the accident.46 Second, the court
held that the expiration date of the policy does not terminate the liability of the insurer for medical expenses incurred within one year
from the date of the accident.4 7 had the court not reached this second
conclusion, problems would have arisen even among those who remain
insured, since many automobile liability policies are rene.wable every
six months.
In summary, the insured who will require medkal services beyond
the one year period can only recover his expenses by paying in advance. What, if anything, less than advance payment, will also bring
48
the medical payments coverage into play may still be an open question.
3.

Reasonable and Necessary

Medical expenses are recoverable as a part of the compensatory
damages awarded the plaintiff in a personal injury action.49 Their recovery can also be provided for by contract, for example, through the
medical payments provision. This Coverage assumes only the obligation: "[T]o pay all reasonable expenses . . . for necessary medical,

surgical, X-ray, and dental services, including prosthetic devices and
necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nursing and funeral services." 50 Thus the insured, in order to recover his expenses under the
insurance contrtact, must be prepared to prove that, (1) the services
were necessary and, (2) that the amount charged was reasonable. 1
This dual test is the same test that would be applied in any personal
injury action seeking compensatory damages for medical expenses paid
52

or incurred.

In attempting to prove reasonableness the insured may meet evidentiary problems. Often the amount charged is not allowed as evidence of reasonableness. 53 The reasonableness of the expense is determined by the charges of the profession generally, not by the amount
46

131 S.E.2d at 348.

4 Id. at 349.
48 The most recent case is Hein v. American Famijy Mutual Insurance Co., 166
N.W.2d 363 (Iowa, 1969). The court said, at 368-69: "The unambiguous
language of the policy provision here in question clearly required either the
payment of the anticipated expenses within the one year period or the incurrence of a legal obligation within such period to pay such expenses in
the future."
6.01, at 83 (1964).
50 Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Services; Northwestern
49 J. GHIARDI, PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES IN WISCONSIN §

5

Nat'l Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Payments.

" Reliance Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Booher, 166 So. 2d 222 (Fla. Ct. App.
1964).
52 Michalski v. Wagner, 9 Wis. 2d 22, 100 N.W.2d 354 (1960).
53 See Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 1347, 1356 (1967).

1969-70]

MEDICAL PAYMENTS PROVISION

charged by a particular physician or surgeon.54 The attending doctor's
expert opinion of the reasonableness of the charge may be introduced
into evidence to aid the jury in its determination of whether a particular expense is reasonable. 55
If the questioned expense has already been paid, this fact may in
some instances be introduced on the issue of reasonableness.56 Some
courts, however, hold that the mere fact of payment is of no evidentiary
value on this issue. 57 The plaintiff in American Central Insurance Co. v.
Melton,5s owned a policy with a $1,000 medical payments provision.
The plaintiff alleged that he had incurred medical expenses and demanded repayment under the contract. The insurer answered by a general denial. The case was heard by the jury. The plaintiff's proof consisted only of his own testimony that he had incurred expenses as the
result of necessary orthopedic and physiotherapeutic treatments, and
that he had actually paid a stated amount. He was not allowed to
testify as to the reasonableness of the expense. The jury gave the
plaintiff a verdict of $800, but the defendant was awarded judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. The Texas court held that the amount paid,
by itself, was no evidence of reasonableness, and since no other competent evidence was submitted the insured must be denied recovery.
In Wisconsin, the amount paid or the liability incurred is evidence
which can go to the jury to assist it in arriving at a reasonable award.59
But the medical bills are not conclusive on the issue of the amount that
should reasonably be paid. 60 The jury determines a reasonable award
and is free to set a figure lower than the bills presented in evidence. 61
Koczka v. Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 6 2 involved a
"whiplash" victim who underwent forty-five or more diathermy treatments to his spine and commenced suit to have this expense ($525)
paid by his medical payments insurer. The insurer defended on the
grounds that the treatments were unnecessary and that the charge for
the treatments was unreasonable. The jury allowed no recovery and
this determination was upheld on appeal. The court declared that if
the jury should find the plaintiff guilty of bad faith in undergoing this
series of treatments, then a verdict of no damages is correct, since the
treatments were unnecessary.
The Koczka case is the only recent medical payments insurance case
dealing with the issue of necessity. The issue has, however, been pre54 Konopka v. Montgomery Ward
55 Annot., supra note 53, at 1392.

& Co., 133 W. Va. 775, 58 S.E.2d 128 (1950).

56 Id. at 1376.
57 Id. at 1370.
5 389 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
69
60 Gerbing v. McDonald, 201 Wis. 214, 229 N.W. 860 (1930).

Lautensdilager v. Hamburg, 41 Wis. 2d 623, 165 N.W.2d 129 (1969).
Seitz 35 Wi 2d 282, 151 N.W.2d 86 (1967).
2d R9, 138 N.W.2d 737 (1966).

61. Seitz v.
62 29 Wis.
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sented in tort cases which clearly indicate that the plaintiff must meet
his burden of proof regarding the necessity of treatment. The plaintiff
is denied recovery when he presents bills for medical expenses, but offers
no proof of the type of treatments or of their necessity. He has the
burden of proving the propriety of medical expenses incurred. A
simple presentation of an unsegregated statement of total cost does not
satisfy this burden. In two recent Wisconsin tort cases, the plaintiffs
were not allowed any recovery for medical expenses. In Smee v.
Checker Cab Co., 63 the plaintiff had already been enroute to see his

doctor because of abdominal pains. The taxi he was riding in was
involved in a collision which caused him to incur a brain concussion.
Another taxi conveyed him to his doctor who had him hospitalized
immediately. The plaintiff was originally awarded $275 for medical
and hospital expenses. This award was reversed on appeal because the
plaintiff had not produced evidence that the amount awarded was for
expenses incurred as a result of the accident. The plaintiff's doctor
testified to the effect that his bill was for treatment primarily of the
abdominal problem. No effort had been made to differentiate between
services rendered in connection with the pre-existing abdominal condition and those made necessary as a result" of the concussion suffered
in the accident. To like effect is Michalski v. Wagner.64 The plaintiff
suffered a "whiplash" injury, and underwent anumber of tests at the
Mayo Clinic. Although the bill from the clinic totaled $460, the plaintiff
was not able to recover any of this amount, since the bill failed to segregate those charges which were for necessary treatment of the "whiplash." Testimony was taken that some portion of the total bill was for
services rendered merely for the sake of giving the plaintiff a complete
physical examination. Since the bill failed to differentiate expenses, the
entire bill was excluded.
While Smee and Michalski did not involve the medical payments
insurance provision, they would probably be followed in cases concerning insurance payments. The policy only pays expenses to one who
had bodily injury caused by accident while occupying an automobile
or through being struck by an automobile. 65 Thus the plaintiff has the
burden of proving that his expenses resulted from bodily injury suffered
in the accident.
Seitz v. Seitz,66 another tort case, might be persuasive authority in
a medical payments insurance dispute. The plaintiff had medical bills

totalling $2,689 admitted into evidence, but the jury awarded only
$1,800. The verdict was affirmed on appeal. The court noted that not
6.31 Wis. 2d 202, 83 N.W.2d 492 (1957).
649
Wis. 2d 22, 100 N.W.2d 354 (1960).
65
Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Services;
western Nat'l Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Payments.
6635 Wis. 2d 282, 151 N.W.2d 86 (1967).

North-
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all, of the bills presented were supported by proof that they were necessary expenses incurred as .a result of the accident.
4. .Categories of Expenses Covered
To be recoverable, the expenses must not only be reasonable and
necessary, but must also fall within one or more of the categories
spefcified in the policy language.
The first category of expense for which payment will be made is
"medical" expense. Fees charged by doctors usually are included here
if made for treatments necessitated by the injury. Expenses incurred
for rental of a vibrator and heater have been allowed.6 7 A doctor's fee
of $35 for preparing a medical report according to the insurer's request has also been allowed.68 This fee for preparing a medical report
would appear to be a legal rather than a medical fee since it is not
related to the treatment of the patient. Nevertheless, it was allowed as
an item of medical services expense.
Surgical expense is provided for and includes expense of reconstructive surgery if deemed necessary. 69
X-ray and dental expenses have not been the subject of litigation,
at least not under a policy which specifically includes X-ray and dental
coverage. Dental expense has been recovered under a policy which did
not provide specifically for "dental" expense but did provide for medical and surgical expense. In Gasul v. Michigan Mutual Liability Co.,70
the insured's dental bridge was damaged in an accident. That court had
little difficulty in determining that dentistry is a subdivision of surgery
and hence covered by the policy.
If the bodily injury necessitates the use of a prosthetic device, the
policy specifically covers this item. An attempt was made in Trachtenberg v. Home Indemnity Co., 7 ' to collect the expense incurred by the

insured in replacing his damaged dental bridge. The insured had the
bridge in his shirt pocket at the time of the accident. Contact with
the steering wheel smashed the dental bridge. The insured contended
that the expense was covered, since caused by accident and since
prosthetic devices were specifically covered by the policy. The court
denied recovery because the injured had not suffered bodily injury to
his face or mouth. The decision indicated that recovery would have
7Guillory v. New York Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 201 So. 2d 366 (La. Ct. "App.
1967).
Claims have been made under medical expense for chiropractors and osteopaths. How should they be treated? What about osteopathy and Christian

68

Science? See Kluwin, Medical Payments Endorsement of Automobile Policies,

15 Ins. Counsel J. 35, 41 (1948).
9 Reliance Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Ill. vs. Booher, 166 So. 2d 222 .(Fla. Ct. App.
1964).
70345 Ill. App. 607, 104 N.E.2d 122 (1952). One source has raised the question
6

of whether dentures are covered for full repair or replacement cost or
whether possible depeciation should be considered. The former was indicated. THE FoRum 27 (McCormick & Clapp eds. 1966).

71

121 N.Y.S.2d 911 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1953).
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been allowed if the bridge was damaged while in the insured's mouth.
Thus a replacement would be covered only if the original prosthetic
device was in use at the time of the accident. The court reasoned that
if the device were being used, it became part of the body, and hence
any damage to it would be a bodily injury and therefore a recoverable
expense.
Hospital service expenses are also specifically provided by the typical provision. The reasonable and necessary expense of items incidental to the hospital stay have been included as compensable damages
in tort actions.7 1 In an action based on a medical payments provision,
the court included the cost of a telephone plus the extra expense incurred for guest trays and a cot used by the patient's guest.7 3 The

patient was in traction during the hospital stay and the court found
it necessary for someone to stay with him.
The policy states that reasonable expenses for necessary hospital
services will be paid. It does not limit payment to services rendered in
any particular type of institution nor is it limited to services while
74
confined in a hospital. In Morris v. Firemn's Fund Insurance Co.,

the insured recovered over $1,200 for hospital services rendered to her
by her son-in-law while she stayed in his home during her post-operative
period. During this period she was undergoing required outpatient
treatment at the hospital. The bill for the son-in-law's services included
itemized amounts for meals, room, laundry, personal care and mileage for conveying the insured to the hospital for treatment. While the
court held these expenses to be for hospital services, it would appear
they were actually expenses for nursing services. If they had been
deemed nursing expenses, they would not have been recoverable under
the policy, since the services were not rendered by a professional
nurse. The court did note that the insured could have elected to stay
in the hospital instead of being treated as an outpatient, in which case
the actual hospital expense would have been much higher than the
amount sought for the son-in-law's services.
Nursing service is a part of the compensatory damages awarded
in a personal injury tort case and there is no requirement that it
be rendered by a professional.'
Under the medical payments provision, however, payment is limited to professional nursing services.
Thus, the insurer is not required to pay for services rendered by a
wife to her husband or for domestic help needed in the home, unless,
of course, these services are performed by a professional nurse and
72 Kalish v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 268 Wis. 492, 67 N.W.2d
868 (1955).
73 Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 179 So. 2d 467 (La. Ct. App.
1965).
7472 N.M. 395, 384 P.2d 465 (1963).
7 Mortiz v. Allied Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 27 Wis. 2d 13, 133 N.W.2d 235
(1965).
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it is necessary that a professional nurse perform them. The term "professional" nurse encompasses the licensed practical nurse as well as the
7 6
registered nurse.
Funeral services are also covered by the medical payments provision.
They too must meet the requirements of being reasonable and necessary. One would not expect the necessity of a funeral to be placed in
issue. However, the reasonableness of the amount charged for the funeral could be a disputed issue. Pan Anterican Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Trammell77 was just such a case. An elderly couple was killed in an
automobile accident. During their lifetime they had very few worldly
possessions, but at their death each was covered by a $2,000 medical
payments provision. Their daughter ordered a $1,500 funeral for each,
including burial in $1,000 copper caskets. The insurer tendered only
$150 per funeral. The case was remanded for a new trial at which
time the jury was to examine each of the itemized services constituting
the funeral and then determine the necessity of that item. Thus, in
effect, the jury was to determine whether it was necessary that a poor
man be buried in a copper casket. If the casket was determined to be
necessary, then the jury was to determine a reasonable charge. However,
the victim's lack of wealth was not to be considered, just as it was
not considered in establishing the premium he paid for his insurance.
Often expenses incidental to death and burial are not recoverable
as funeral expenses. The expenses incurred for a grave, a cantor and
a rabbi have been allowed as necessary, but the expense incurred for
perpetual care of the grave was not recovered.7 8 The expense for a
burial vault, where not usually furnished as a part of the funeral, has
79
been deemed not necessary and therefore not recoverable.
B. DIVISION ONE: PAYMENTS TO NAMED INSUREDS AND RELATIVES
In order to distinguish between the coverage afforded the named
insureds (and their relatives) and other persons, the medical payments
provision is separated into Divisions One and Two. The former defines
the coverage for the named insureds and each relative, and the latter
for certain other persons. Division One generally reads as follows:
Division 1. To or for the named insured and each relative who
sustains bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter called "bodily injury," caused by
accident,
(a) while occupying the owned automobile,
(b) while occupying a non-owned automobile, but only if such
person has, or reasonably believes he has. the permission
Shapiro v. Aetna Ins. Co., 26 Misc. 2d 820, 208 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Special T. 1960).
See also 226 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Trial T. 1962).
7 322 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
78 Bachrach v. Aetna Ins. Co., 51 Misc. 2d 91, 272 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Civ. Ct. 1966),
aff'd, 52 Misc. 2d 934, 27"7 N.Y.S.2d 231 (App. T. 1966).
79
Alamo Cas. Co. v. Smith, 266 S.W2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
70
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of the owner to use the automobile and the use is within
the scope of such permission, or
struck by an automobile or by a trailer of
through being
any type. 80
1. Caused
by Accident

Division One allows payment of "all reasonable expenses incurred
within one year from the date of accident."81 Both Division One and
Division Two cover only bodily injury "caused by accident. '82 Apparently the word "accident," by itself, has created little difficulty in
construing the medical payments provision. One case involving the
medical payments provision defined the word accident as "an undesigned; sudden and unexpected event."8 3 This definition differs little
84
from that found in cases not involving the medical payments provision,
85
or even from that used in Workmen's Compensation law. One a~uthority has listed the wording of the definitions to illustrate that they
differ only in form. 86 The rule seems to be that: "[T]he word 'accident'
has never acquired any technioal signification in law, and when used
in insurance contracts, it is to be construed and considered according
'8 7
to the ordinary understanding and common usage of people generally.
There has been more difficulty, however, with the entire phrase
"caused by accident," as used in the medical payments provision. It
is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to segregate those cases dealing
with "accident" from those dealing with "caused by accident"-no such
attempt has been made. In some cases the question has been whether
the injury was caused by a prior condition, rather than by the accident. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Miller,88 a wife had been hospitalized,
at least partially due to a beating given to her by her husband. She also
80 Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Payments, Divi-

sion 1.

81 Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Services; North-

western Nat'l Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Payments.

82Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Divisions 1 and 2; Northwestern Nat'l Ins.
Co. Policy, Divisions 1 and 2.
83 Collins v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 271 Minn. 239, 135 N.W.2d 503 (1965). The
case held, not surprisingly, that turning too quickly in freezing rain thereby
causing a skid into a utility pole was an accident within the meaning of the
8 policy.
4Koehring Co. v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 353 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1965)
(involving breakdown of cement mixers caused by failure to install adequately
designed cylinders); Watson v. Western Cas. Sur. Co., 72 N.M. 250 382
P.2d 723 (1963) (general liability insurer); Clark v. London & Lancashire
Indem. Co. of Am., 21 Wis. 2d 268, 124 N.W.2d 29 (1963) (insurance against
bodily injury caused by accident and arising out of the plaintiff's operation
of a gravel pit; actually construed phrase "caused by accident") ; Schneider
v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 24 Wis. 28, 29-30 (1869) (policy insuring against

death by accident covered the negligent and disastrous attempt of insured

to board a moving train).
85Yellow Cab Co. v. Industrial Comm., 210 Wis. 460, 246 N.W. 689 (1933);
Vennen v. New Dells Lumber Co., 161 Wis. 370, 154 N.W. 640 (1915).
8610 G. Coucn, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANcE LAW § 4:16, at 26 (1962).
87

St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Northern Grain Co., 365 F.2d 361, 364

(8th Cir. 1966).
88 152 Colo. 249, 381 P.2d 255 (1963).
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had a history of serious back trouble. The day after her release from
the hospital she was involved in an automobile accident which caused
an alleged injury to her back. The court held that it was a jury question whether the injuries were "caused by accident," and pointed out
that the jury, which held- for the plaintiff; probably had heeded the
plaintiff's doctor who testified that: "Something happened between the
two dates . . .,,I
A similar case is Minsky v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co.90 The
plaintiff had suffered from cancer since 1954. The accident occurred in
1959. Within a year of the accident the plaintiff died, after being hospitalized almost that entire year. The medical testimony was convincing
that the hospitalization was, with some minor exceptions, solely due
to cancer. The failure of the plaintiff to segregate the expenses resulted
in the nonrecovery of even that small portion of the expenses which
were caused by the accident. 9 '
The proposition that medical testimony is of extreme importance in
cases involving prior cause is-further shown by Zeringne v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. 92 The plaintiff, claimed that an abortion was
caused by "emotional disturbance" over an accident which had occurred
thirty-five days earlier. Throughout her life the plaintiff had had a
history of abortions for health reasons. In an action on the medical
payments provision in plaintiff's automobile liability policy, the court
held for the insurer, relying upon medical testimony as to the difficulty
of causing an abortion. It said:
This was and is obviously a medical question on which we must
be guided almost entirely by the opinion of the only doctor who
treated Mrs. Zeringne. He, in great detail, outlined various evidences of impending abortion and, discussed some of the causes
thereof, and finally concluded that, in his opinion, while it was
possible that the episode on the railroad track might have caused
the abortion, he felt that that had not been the cause."
A slightly different type of causation question arises when the defense argues that the causal connection between accident and injury
is too remote to allow recovery. In Wagner v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,9 4 an eighty-five year old plaintiff received lacerations and
fractured ribs in an automobile accident. He soon developed three
89 381 P.2d at 258.
99 358 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
0' Id. at 669. The court speaks in the tort terminology of "proximate causation."
The question should be posed whether the entire literature of proximate causation in tort should be injected into the medical payments provision. There
probably is no alternative.
92185 So. 2d 100 (La. Ct. App. 1966).
931d. at 101; see Hudak v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Ohio App.. 306, 167
N.E.2d 666, 670 (1960) (poor reasoning in that the causal connection must
be between the injury and accident, not the expenses and accident).
94 235 N.E.2d 741' (Ohio C.P., Montgomery County, 1968) (Family Compensation Insurance Endorsement 479D-3, quite similar to medical payments provision, was being litigated).
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complications-uremia, encephalopathy and acute urinary retention. The
court allowed him to recover for the complications since they were "not
necessarily uncommon following trauma to a man of his advanced
'
age."95
The fourth day after the accident, "[H]e became restless and
confused and despite restraints would get out of bed and walk at various intervals.

' 96

On the eighth day after the accident the plaintiff was

discovered lying on the floor of his room and was found to have a
fractured femur. As to the medical and hospital expenses necessitated
by treatment of the fracture, the court held for the insurer:
There is no causal connection between the automobile accident and the fall in the hospital. The fall was an independent
accident and the medical and hospital expenses incurred in the
care and treatment of the resulting fractured femur may 9 have
7
been caused by the failure to properly restrain the plaintiff.
The court quoted the Latin maxim that the direct cause, rather than
the remote cause, is to be considered. 98
The concept of an independent accident, or more accurately, intervening cause, was also argued by the insurer in American Family
Life Insurance Co. v. Robinson.99 A parked automobile rolled backward, knocking the plaintiff-pedestrian to the ground and causing a gun,
which he was carrying, to discharge. The plaintiff brought an action
on his medical payments provision seeking recovery for injuries caused
by the discharge. The accidental discharge of the gun was held to be
'100
"directly caused by the automobile striking the insured.
Because the words "caused by accident" have not been construed
often by the courts, one court decided that those cases construing the
phrase "accidental means" can be "guiding beacons" in a case involving
a "caused by accident" issue.10' The plaintiff had twisted his back by
stepping directly into a pickup truck instead of using the running board.
The court reasoned that the injury was the only fortuity, since the
insured purposefully took the higher step. Had the plaintiff claimed
that he had missed the running board or slipped, he apparently would
have recovered. 10 2 Surely, such fine distinctions should be confined only
to those policies which still actually bear the burden of the words
"accidental means."
95 235 N.E.2d at 744.
96 Id.
9

at 742.

7Id. at 745.

98

Id. ("causa proxima non remota spectatur").

99 115 Ga. App. 526, 154 S.E.2d 763 (1967). This case involved a personal acci-

dent policy, the operative words of which read: "provided such bodily injuries
are caused solely by reason of an automobile ... accident."
100 Id.
IoLSeeley v. Pilot Fire & Cas. Co., 432 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tenn. 1968).
102 Id. at 62.
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The defense in Columbia Casualty Co. v. Abel made a similar argument. 0 3 In that case a young man attempted to assault his date. She
was preparing to jump from the moving automobile when the man
swerved the automobile and accelerated. She fell out, striking her head
on the pavement. The insurer argued that she intentionally jumped from
the automobile and that she could not recover from the man's insurer
because her injuries were not "caused by accident." The court gave two
reasons for allowing recovery. First, and directly opposed to the
Robinson case, she could recover because she intended to land on her
feet and did not anticipate the actual result. 0 4 The Robinson court
would presumably have ruled for the insu'rance company on such an
issue. The second basis for the reasoning in Abel highlights an important factual distinction between the two cases. In Robinson there
was one cause, the intentional stepping directly into the truck, whereas
in Abel there were two causes: the swerving of the automobile by the
driver and the intentional jump by his date. The court in Abel reasoned
that:
[The policy] did not restrict or limit the obligation of the company in those respects to instances where bodily injury was
caused solely and exclusively of all other causes by accident
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the automobile. And where accidental injury is proximately caused by
two or more concurrent causes only one of which is within the
coverage of a p6licy of this kind, the company is liable even
though other causes contribute to the accident. 0 5
This case shows, among other things, the importance of the exact wording of the policy. Had the policy read "injury caused solely by accident," the plaintiff would not have recovered.
In Abel the court do.dged the question of whether recovery should
be prevented because the "accident" irrvolved was closely related to an
assault and battery. The court probably so reasoned because the plaintiff could not have recovered by the specific terms of the policy, if an
assault or battery had been "committed by the insured or at his direction."'0 8 Assaults not committed by the insured or at his direction
were deemed accidents by the -policy. The issue of whether an assault
and battery can be termed an accident within the medical payments
07
provision was raised in Goetz v. GeneralFire & Life Assurance Corp.
The plaintiff's automobile was stopped by three robbers who forced him
out of the car and stabbed him. The court denied recovery, stressing
that the assault "was not connected in any way with the automobile
other than the incidental fact that the driver was operating it at the
103 171 F.2d 215 (10th Cir. 1948).
104 Id. at 218.
105 Id. at 218-19 (emphasis added).

'O Id. at 216.
10747 Misc. 2d 67, 262 N.Y.S.2d 305 (App. T. 1965).
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time.""' A. dissenting opinion, in addition to discussing the "occupying" argument which was held determinative by the majority, said,
"[I]f the assault be without provocation by the person assaulted, it
should be regarded as an accident within the meaning of any insurance
policy including the instant one for medical expense, unless the policy
specifically excludes an injury caused by an assault." 109 '
Finally, one case has held that an escaping felon, who wrecks his
automobile while he is the subject of hot pursuit, can recover for his
injuries under the medical payments provision." 0 The Michigan Supreme Court rejected the public policy arguments of the lower courts
that the allowance of recovery would encourage crime. As happens
so often in this area of "caused by accident," the insurer was chastised
for not writing a more specific contract exempting "injuries sustained
as the result of violation of law.""'
The words "caused by accident" in the medical payments provision
have been the subject of litigation as to prior cause, remote cause,
intervening cause, concurrent causes and accidental means. They have
been the focus of litigation involving highly unusual fact situations. It
does not seem rash to predict that such cases will continue to arise.
2. Relative
The medical payments provisions often allow payments "to or for
12
the named insured and each relative who sustains bodily injury.'
The' word "relative" is commonly defined in the Definitions section of
the policy as "a person related to the named insured who is a resident
of the same household."'1 This word has caused some problems. In
cases involving fhe provision there has been little litigation concerning
the words "related to." One case seemed to involve both consanguinity
and affinity, but really only held that a granddaughter was related to
"the named insured." 1 4 Another medical payments case has held that a
stepdaughter is a relative."' The children of the named instred were
passengers in an automobile owned by his stepdaughter. The named
insured was denied coverage under 'the medical payment provisions of
his automobile family combination policy for the injuries of his children"because the stepdaughter came within an exclusion for automobiles
los Id. at 70, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 308.

Id. at 70, N.Y.S.2d at 309 (dissenting opinion).
Davis v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 356 Mich. 454, 96 N.W.2d 760 (1959).
11196 N.W.2d at 763.
112 Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Services, Division 1;
Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. Policy Coverage C-Medical Payments, Division 1.
113 Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Services, Definitions;
cf. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Payments,
Definitions (same practical effect).
114 Newcomb v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 260 N.C. 402, 133 S.E.2d 3 (1963).
"15 Smith v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 32 App. Div. 2d 854, 300 N.Y.S.2d 975
(1969). The policy defined "relative" as "a relative of named insured who
is a resident of the same household."
109
110
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owned by relatives. After pointing out that it was clumsy for the
insurer to attempt to define the word "relative" in its policy by using
the word to be defined, the court said:
When "relative" is considered along with the limiting phrase
"resident 6f the same household," the policy intent to deny coverage to other cars readily available to covered persons within the
same household is noted, and the close affinity, although not consanguinity, present in the stepdaughter-stepfather relationship is
recognized, it is our opinion that [the named insured's stepdaughter] was a "relative" under the policy giving that term its
plain, ordinary" meaning as understood by the average
man ......
This case is distinguishable from others construing the words "related
to" or "who is a resident of the same household" because it involved
an atypical exclusionary clause.
The primary difficulty is with the words "who is a resident of the
same household." In Arellano v. Maryland Casualty Co.,"17 the named
insured husband, due to an argument with his wife, moved out of the
house about one and one-half years before the accident in question. He
owned the house where his wife and daughter continued to live and
he sometimes paid for the utilities. When the named insured's daughter
was injured in an automobile accident it was held that she was not a
"relative" of her father, under the medical payments provision, because
she was not 'living "under the -same roof" as the insured at the time
of the accident." 8 The house that the father maintained for them was
not "the same household" in which he lived.
In one case the question arose, due to the peculiar wording of the
policy, whether the household had to be a household headed by the
named insured."19 The policy offered coverage to those related to the
named insured "while residents of his household. 1 20 The named insured
was an adult bachelor who lived at home with his parents. The plaintiff was his brother, also a bachelor living at home. The court held
that it was ambiguous whether "household" meant one headed by the
2
named insured or "the household of which insured is a member."' '
The policy, of course, was construed in favor of coverage. It appears
that if "household" does not mean a household headed by the named
insured under 'this policy, it surely could not have' that meaning under
the typical policy, which does not include the word "his."
Having two houses to live in does not prevent coverage if the plaintiff and the named insured are residents of the same household "at
l16 300 N.Y.S2d at 976-77.
"17 312 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
11s Id. at 702.

"19 Lene v. M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co., 301 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957).
Id. at 875.
Id. at 876.
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the time the casualty occurred.' 1 22 Even if the plaintiff lived with her
grandmother only while the plaintiff's brothers were away at college,
she could recover if the accident occurred while she was living there. 2 '
A temporary absence from home does not deny one medical payments coverage. A high school girl spent her summer vacation working
24
long hours as a waitress at a resort twenty-five miles from home.1
It was most convenient for her to stay overnight, as all the girls did
in rooms provided for them. There was no question that she planned
to return home to finish high school in the autumn. The court held
that: "[A] n established residence is not lost by temporary absence therefrom, either on business or on pleasure, with no intention to abandon
that residence or acquire another."' 25
The key question in these cases is whether there has been mani1 26
fested an intention to abandon the former actual residence.
3. Automobile; Owned Automobile; Mon-Owned Automobile
Dhvision One of the medical payments provision, the coverage for
the named insured and relatives, is divided into three subsections, all
of which employ the word "automobile."' 127 The word does not appear
to have a meaning in the medical payments provision any different
from that used in automobile insurance law generally. 12 The word
"automobile" is not ambiguous and is given its common meaning. A
motorcycle is not an automobile within the medical payments provision. 129 It almost goes without saying that a motor scooter is not an
automobile.2 0
122 Newcomb v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 260 N.C. 402, 113 S.E.2d 3, 6 (1963).
12Id.
124 Glarkson v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 413 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
125 Id. at 14. The case is made even stronger by the fact that the policy read:
"who is a resident of and actually living in the same household as the named
insured." It was held that "actual" means permanent rather than physical. Id.
126 Goodsell v. State Auto. & Cas. Underwriters, 153 N.W.2d 458 (Iowa 1967).
The dissent in this case raised the close question that there is a distinction
between an intention to return and a non-intention to stay where one is.
The close case is where the plaintiff "was going to take up permanent residence elsewhere but did not know where." Id. at 464 (dissenting opinion).
"2 Eliott, The Insurance Definition of Automobile, 1967 INs. L. J. 596.
128 Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Services, Division 1;
Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Payments, Division 1.
9
" Kershaw v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 2 Conn. Cir. 164, 196 A.2d 817, 819
(1963) (motorcycle differs from a bicycle "only in the fact of its being propelled by mechanical power and not muscular.") ; Whiddon v. Cotton States
Mut. Ins. Co., 109 Ga. App. 137, 135 S.E.2d 521 (1964) (motor driven
vehicles is a broader term which includes motorcycles) ; Beeler v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Ins. Co., 48 Tenn. App. 370, 346 S.W.2d 457,
459 (1960) (following the "almost universal holdings" that a motorcycle
is not an automobile).
so Labracio v. Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y., 66 N.J. Super. 216, 168 A.2d 682, 683
(1961) ("A motor scooter has been held to be nothing more than a motorcycle"); Texas Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wyble, 333 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960) ("[A] scooter is even farther removed from the term 'automobile'
than is a motor cycle.").
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The difficulty arises with hybrid vehicles such as the Post Office
Department's "mailsters."' 31 This vehicle has two wheels in the rear
and one in the front and weighs about 800 pounds. One court meticulously compared the mailster's characteristics to those of both an automobile and a motorcycle. 132 The court held that it was in "every essential respect" an automobile, not a motorcycle, and that the medical
payments coverage was applicable.' 33 Other more specialized problems
with the meaning of the word "automobile" occur as to the third section
of Division One, "through being struck by an automobile." These prob34
lems will be discussed in another part of this article.1
Some difficulty has also occurred as to "owned automobile" and
"non-owned automobile." If "owned automobile" is defined in the
policy as that automobile specifically described in the policy, obviously
there is no coverage for an automobile not so described. 35 On the cther
hand, one case has held that the absence of this specific definition will
not limit the coverage only to described automobiles, even if there is
3 6
a blank in the policy for "Description of owned automobile.' 3
The term "non-owned automobile" is commonly defined in the
automobile liability policy to mean: "[An automobile or trailer not
owned by or furnished for the regular use of either the named insured
37
or any relative, other than a temporary substituted automobile.""1
This language has been the subject of several medical payments cases,
a typical example of which is Bringle v. Economy Fire & Casualty
Co."8 The plaintiff was a carpet layer. His employer owned five trucks
which were used to carry material and personnel to installation sites.
The plaintiff was injured while in one of these trucks. He brought an
action unsuccessfully on his medical payments provision, claiming that
the vehicle was not furnished for his regular use because he had the
use of the vehicle only for business purposes. The court held that the
trucks were furnished for his regular use. It relied on five "signposts"
that had been devised in another case."39
Le Croy v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 251 N.C. 19, 110 S.E.2d 463 (1959).
S.E.2d at 466. The court considered the following factors: (1) Does it
stand upright when not in operation? (2) How exposed is the rider? (3)
Does a driver or passenger ride in or on it?
133 Id.
"34 See the section of this article, "Through Being Struck by an Automobile,"
p. 475; Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Division 1 (c); Northwestern Nat'l
Ins. Co. Policy, Division 1 (c).
1 Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Lipe, 116 Ga. App. 169, 156 S.E.2d 490 (1967).
"

'32 110

136 American Indem. Co. v. Garcia, 398 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). No

cases were found dealing specifically with "non-owned automobile" within the
context of a medical payments provision problem.
137 Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. Policy, Part I-Liability, Definitions; cf. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Part I-Liability, Definitions.
31" 169 N. W.2d 879 (Iowa 1969).
1 Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marr, 128 F. Supp. 67, 70 (D. NJ. 1955).
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Was the use of the car in question made available most of
the time to the insured? [Answered Yes.] ,
2. Did the insured make more than mere occasional use of the
car? [Yes.]
3. Did the insured need to obtain permission to use the car or
had that been granted by blanket authority? [Blanket authority.]
4. Was there a purpose for the use of the car in the permission
granted or by the blanket authority and was it being used
for such purpose? [Yes.]
in0 the area 'where it would be expected
5. Was it being used 14
to be used? [Yes.]

1.

Other courts have similarly construed the definition of "non-owned
automobile.' 14 1 No cases were found dealing with the question of temp6rary substitute automobile within the context of the medical payments provision.
4. Occupying
An insured who sustains bodily injury while occupying an automobile may recover his attendant medical expenses within the limits of
the medical payments provision. It is the purpose of this section to
determine the coverage afforded by the term "occupying." "Occupying"
is defined under Coverage C as "in or upon or entering into or alighting
from" an automobile.1 42 The coverage extended to an injured party
under this definition is broad, yet each component term is limited in its
application. Therefore, the coverage afforded while "occupying" an
automobile may best be understood by illustrating how each term has
been construed by the courts.
In construing the terms "in," "upon," .entering into," and "alighting from," the courts have uniformly found some ambiguity and, under
insurance contract rules of interpretation, have interpreted the language in favor of the insured.
a. In. The term 'in" is the easiest to understand. Because of the
common view that the component terms of the definition of "occupying"
1 43
are not synonymous, the coverage that "in" affords is quite limited.
The terms "upon," "entering into," and "alighting from" are expansions of the basic coverage afforded by the term "in." It appears that
the term "in" has a limited practical application to injuries sustained
140

141

169 N.W.2d at 882.
O'Brien v. Halifax Ins. Co. of Mass., 141 So. 2d 307 (Fla. Ct. App. 1962);
Brouillette v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 163 So. 2d 389 (La. Ct. App. 1964)

(a particularly good discussion) ; Dickerson v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of
Tex., 139 So. 2d 785 (La. Ct. App. 1962) ; Moor v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.,
239 Miss. 130, 121 So. 2d 125 (1960) ; see also Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 937 ('1962);
cf. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Hyde, 232 Ark. 1020, 342 S.W.2d 295 (1961).
142 The Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Definitions.
143

See, e.g., McAbee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 249 S.C. 96, 152 S.E.2d 731,
732 (1967); R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 8.02, at 8-6

(1969).
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by one while actually within the passenger compartment of an automobile.
The rule is different as to accident policies which provide coverage for injury only while in an automobile: "One does not have to be
actually sitting in the place ordinarily provided for the accommodation
of passengers in an automobile in order to come within the coverage
of a provision in a policy indemnifying against injuries sustained while
'in' an automobile."14 4 In Independence Insurance C. v. Jeffries'
Admr,1 4 5 an action was brought on a'n accident policy providing benefits for accidental death or disability sustained by the wrecking of any
automobile "in which the insured is riding." The insured was riding
on the running board outside the car. The car swerved abruptly and
the insured was thrown off the automobile, struck his heid and later
died as a result of the injuries. The insilrer argued that the decedent
was not riding in the car as provided in the policy. The court rejected
this argument, stating that the policy language was ambiguous and
would be construed most strongly against the insurer. The court ruled
that the word "in"is ordinarily accepted and used as an equivalent
to the word "on" and that the insured was in the automobile under
such an interpretation. The court indicated that the result might have
been different if the words "within" or "actually in" had been used
to show an intent to limit the coverage to the space set apart for the
use of passengers.1 46
Since the terms "in" and "one are not synonymous, those cases which
interpret "in" as equivalent to "on" are rendered superfluous when
the definition of occupying includes both "in" and "on." Therefore,
the coverage afforded by the term "in" in the medical payments provision is properly limifed to injury sustained by one while in the passenger compartment.
b. Upon. Two theories or rules have developed with regard to the
construction of the term "upon." The first of these is the physical contact theory which has been stated as follows:
In some cases where the injury sustained was determined to
be within the coverage of a clause in a policy providing for indemnity for injuries sustained while. .. "upon," an "automobile,
the injured person, although not sitting in the place provided
for the seating of passengers, was in some sort of physical contact with thr automobile.1 47
144Annot., 39 A.L.R2d 952, 955 (1955).
145

146

294 Ky. 680, 172 S.W.2d 566 (1943).
For cases 'with similar fact situations reaching the same result, see Stewart v.

North Am. Acc. Ins. Co., 33 S.W.2d 1005 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931) and Inter
Ocean Ins. Co. v. Norris, 205 Tenn. 217, 326 S.W.2d 437 (1959).
147 Annot., supra note 144, at 956.
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McAbee v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 148 applied the physical

contact theory. The action was on a policy which provided indemnity
in case of bodily injury or death while in or upon, entering or alighting
from, a described motor vehicle. The insured sustained fatal injuries
when he was crushed against the rear of a stationary vehicle by a
tractor rolling down a slope. The sole question was whether the insured, while standing with his back against the vehicle and his arms
out in an effort to keep the tractor from rolling against him, was "upon"
the vehicle within the meaning of the policy. The court, in allowing
recovery, stated:
[W]e do not think that the meaning of the word "upon" is
restricted to "on top of," as when the weight of a person's body
is resting upon or supported by the vehicle ....
One of the common and ordinary meanings of the word
"upon" is that of "contact with". . . . Since the policy contains
no restrictions as to how or in what manner the insured was
to be upon the vehicle, we think it reasonable to conclude that
the parties contemplated a construction of the word that would
include actual physical contact with the vehicle the insured was
using. 149

The second rule of construction formulated in interpreting "upon"
is the "use" rule. According to this rule, as long as the insured is
injured as a direct result of the risk insured against (the use of the
automobile) he is covered. An illustrative case is Madden v. Farm
Bureau Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.' 50 This was an action on
a medical payments provision covering injury while occupying an automobile. The insured had stopped to change a flat tire; after he had
changed the tire and while in the act of placing the removed tire in
his trunk, he was struck by an approaching automobile and wedged
between the automobiles. While placing the removed tire in the trunk,
the insured was standing behind the automobile and almost touching it,
and was leaning forward with the upper part of his body and arms
in the trunk. The insurer argued that the insured was not "in" or
"'upon" or "entering" or "alighting from" the automobile at the time
he was injured. The court answered this argument:
However, he was using the automobile and was in such relation
to it as to subject himself to the hazard insured against and was
injured as a direct result of that risk ....

It seems to us that it

was the intent of the insurer, by the language used, to provide
for coverage in every case in which the owner was using the
automobile and in such a position in relation thereto as to be
injured in its use. In reaching a conclusion on this subject, not
148249 S.C. 96, 152 S.E.2d 731 (1967).
14

Id. at 732-33.

15082 Ohio App. 111, 79 N.E2d 586 (1948).
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only the act in which the insured was engaged at the time, but
also his purpose and intent must be considered. 15'
The court accordingly held that the policy covered the plaintiff's injuries.
Another case in which the "use" rule was applied is Pennsylvania
National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Bristow, 52 an action under
an uninsured motorist endorsement which provided coverage while
"occupying" the insured automobile. The plaintiff had raised the hood of
the car and was leaning over the motor to check some of the wiring. His
legs were touching the bumper and his stomach may have been touching
the automobile. At that moment, the disabled automobile was struck by
an automobile driven by an uninsured motorist and the plaintiff was injured. The issue was whether the plaintiff was covered by the policy
of the driver of the disabled vehicle. More precisely, was the plaintiff
"upon" the automobile at the time of the accident? The court rejected
the "physical contact" or "touching" theory and accepted the "use"
theory by declaring:
The word "upon" must be viewed with relation to the word
in the policy which it defines, that is, the word "occupying."
When the disputed word is so viewed and read, it is clear
that to be "upon" an insured vehicle is to have some connection
with "occupying" it ....
Within the purposes contemplated here, a person may be
said to be "upon" a vehicle when he is in a status where he is
not actually "in," or is not in the act of "entering into or alighting from," the vehicle, but whose connection . . . relates to his

"occupying" it.'5 4

Since the plaintiff had not used the automobile in relation to the risk
insured against, he was denied coverage.
It would appear that the "use" rule is the better way to construe the
word "upon." Although "upon" is clearly meant to cover a class of
situations not necessarily included in the other component terms, mere
physical contact by a person with an automobile should not subject an
insurer to liability for medical expenses.
c. Entering. The words "entering into" constitute a simple phrase
and would appear at first to present no problem. Such is not the case.
The problem of the courts is the ascertainment of the moment when
the act of entering begins. Once it is ascertained that entrance into the
automobile had started, then coverage will be allowed. Any point short
of that moment will be termed an "approach" and, even though carried out with intent to enter, will fall short of the required action on
's' 79 N.E2d at 588.
252 2D7 Va. 381, 150 S.E.2d 125 (1966).
's 150 S.E.2d at 128.
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the part of the injured person. Two cases will amply illustrate this
distinction.
In New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Fromer,5 the plaintiff had
stopped to investigate a possible collision between his car and another
car. He was struck by a third automobile while about six feet from
his car. He was returning to his car for the purpose of entering it.
The plaintiff sought recovery of his medical expenses under his policy
coverage for injury while entering an automobile. The court referred
to the Webster's definition of "entering" and found it to be the equivalent to "going into; passing into the interior of." The court then concluded:
Applying these word meanings to the present situation ...
plaintiff was plainly not "entering" his automobile when his
injury occurred. .

.

. True [plaintiff] says he was in the act

of walking toward his automobile "to enter same." But the
most that can be said for this activity is that he was approaching
the vehicle for the prospective purpose of "entering." We cannot
agree that an intent to enter converts an act of approaching
into an act of "entering."1 55 .
Judgment was entered for the defendant-insurer.
Goodwin v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.'56 also involved the
meaning of the term "entering." The plaintiffs, who had attended a wedding, started back to their automobile in order to return home. One of
them had unlocked and opened the right front door and was reaching
to unlock the rear door; another was holding the front door; a third
was standing beside it; and a fourth had hold of the handle of the rear
door. At that moment an oncoming vehicle collided with the plaintiffs,
causing injuries to.each of them. In allowing coverage under the "entering" term of the medical expenses provision, the court said: "They
had all completed their approach to the car, they were not coming up
to it with the purpose of entering it, they had reached it, and they were
actually engaged in the process of getting in. That is what Coverage D
[medical expenses] intended by 'entering.

' -' '

)15

These cases illustrate the importance of' determining the time at
which approach has ended and the point at which the act of entering
the automobile has, begun.
d. Alighting. From. Litigation regarding the construction of the
"alighting from" aspect of the definition of occupying has arisen due
to a failure of the insurance contract to define when the act of alighting
is completed. Accordingly, the courts have construed the term most
favorably to the insured. However, the courts have differed as to when
15475 A.2d 645 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1950).
155 Id. at 648.
356

199 Md. 121, 85 A2d 759 (1952).

1.5785

A.2d at 764.
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one has reached the point of no-return, that is, when one has completed the act of "alighting" so as to cut off the coverage provided by
that term.
A New York court, in Katz v. Ocean Accident & Guaranty
Corp.,08 has applied a "naturally and consequentially related" test in
defining the coverage afforded by the term "alighting." The plaintiff's
wife, after getting out of the driver's seat, was locking the automobile
with her hand upon the door. Suddenly seeing an oncoming vehicle
bearing down on her she ran behind her automobile to protect herself.
The oncoming automobile struck her car and pushed it back, crushing
her between her car and one that had, been parked behind it. The insurer refused payment on the ground that she was not alighting from
the automobile-that the injured party must have some physical contact with some part of the automobile at the time of the accident. The
court rejected this narrow interpretation and held that she was covered
by the policy. It concluded:
[I]t would appear that plaintiff's wife was still in the act of
alighting from the car because the ordinary individual reading
the terms of the policy in the instant case would naturally conclude that locking the door of a car is a natural and consequential
act related to the actual alighting from the car and securing
same properly. 159
The Mississippi Supreme Court used a "continuity of movement"
test in construing "alighting" in St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v.
Broyles. 60 The plaintiff had- parked her automobile in a garage located
at the top of a sloping drive, pulled on the hand brake, stepped out of
the automobile, closed the door and walked to the rear of the car with
the intent to enter her house. The automobile's brakes slipped while
the plaintiff was behind the rear bumper and the automobile ran over
the plaintiff while she was running to avoid it. Defendant-insurer
denied coverage since plaintiff had already lighted from the automobile
and was finished with it for the time. The court rejected this argument.
It reasoned:
[The medical payments provision] applies to injuries . . .
"while" alighting from the automobile. This means "during the
time that" or "as long as."..... The word "while" connotes some
continuity of actions by the injured person.
"Alighting" from the automobile literally means to remove
a burden from it, to get down or descend.
Considering these terms together, the entire provision, and
the context of its purpose in such a policy, we think that it exThere was a continuity of
tends to and covers the injuries ....
158 202 Misc. 745, 112 N.Y.S.2d 737 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1952).
159

112 N.Y.S.2d at 739.

160 230 Miss. 45, 92 So. 2d 252 (1957).
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movement, and . . . there was no interruption in [plaintiff's]

actions involved in the act of alighting from the car and leaving
it.
Coverage C should not be disassociated ...

so as to limit the

meaning of the word "alighting" to simply161the physical act of
stepping out of the car and on the ground.
Perhaps the most reasonable interpretation of "alighting" is found
16 2
There
in the case of Carta v. Providence Washington Indemnity Co.

the Connecticut Supreme Court adopted a "naturally related" test but
with the added refinement of an "independent course of conduct" limitation. The facts in this case are arazingly similar to those of the Broyles
case.1 63 Here the plaintiff was injured when the automobile she had
alighted from ran over her as she attempted to pass in front of it to
enter a cafe. The court held that the policy left uncertain the point at
which the act of alighting is complete and that such ambiguity would
forbid a narrow construction of the term. The court laid down the
test as follows:
The purpose of the coverage was to pay the bills incurred by a
person injured as the result of an accident occurring while he
was engaged in the variety of actions normally performed by
one getting out of an automobile .

. .

. Some reasonable length

of time must be allowed a person, after getting out, for the comcan reasonably be expected from those in
pletion of acts which
1 64
similar situations.

The following limitation was put on the foregoing rather indefinite
test: "A person is not in the process of alighting if, at the time, he
has completed all acts normally performed by the average person in
getting out of an automobile under similar conditions and if he has
embarked upon a course of conduct entirely distinct from acts reasonably necessary to make an exit from the car."'1

65

Applying this test,

the court ruled that the plaintiff was not alighting from the automobile
when injured, and recovery was denied.
The "independent course of conduct" limitation, as enunciated by
the court in Carta, appears, for three reasons, to be the best definition
of when one is "alighting from" an automobile. First, it affords the
finder of fact an ascertainable cutoff point in construing the term
"alighting." Second, it resolves the ambiguity in favor of the insured
without extending the coverage beyond the plain meaning of the words.
Third, it comes closest to arriving at the intent of the parties. 166
161 92 So. 2d at 254.
162 143 Conn. 372, 122 A.2d 734 (1956).
163 230 Miss. 45, 92 So. 2d 252 (1957).
164 122 A.2d at 736.
165 Id. at 737.
166 Perhaps the ultimate attempt to expand the definitional content of the term
"occupying" occurred in Hollingworth v. American Guarantee & Liability
Ins. Co., 254 A.2d 438 (R.I. 1969). The plaintiff pedestrian in that case,
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5. Through Being Struck by an Automobile
One of the major areas of contention over the medical payments
provision is the definitional content of subsection (c) of Division One
(the coverage division for named insureds and their relatives), which
allows coverage to one who is injured "through being struck by an
automobile."'1 1

7

The phrase is espoused by plaintiffs who are, most

often, named insureds and not qualified under the other sections of
the medical payments provision. The most obvious example is a pedestrian who is run over by an automobile. He is occupying neither an
owned nor non-owned automobile and must rely on subsection (c).
The problem also arises when a plaintiff without medical payments
coverage attempts to benefit from such coverage held by the defendant
tortfeasor. Most of the cases to be discussed and cited involve a medical
payments provision. Some cases- involve precursors of such coverage
which had substantially similar language (for example, accident policies
for pedestrians). (Such differences as exist will be footnoted.) The
courts have often ignored the fact that a policy in a precedential case
did not involve a medical payments provision and have instead focused
on the actual words "through being struck by an automobile." Schematic
diagrams are included in the hope that they might possibly aid the
reader in understanding the total problem as well as each fact grouping.
a. No Physical Touching With Plaintiff

®<

5
Figure 1.

"S," enclosed in a rectangle in this figure, and in those to follow, is
the striking vehicle. The arrow indicates the striking. The encircled
"P" indicates the person of the plaintiff. When enclosed in a rectangle,
the plaintiff is an automobile. In such a case there is no physical touching between the striking vehicle and the person of the plaintiff.
I According to the literal language of the policy, the plaintiff has not
been struck by an automobile. Rather, his automobile has been struck
by another automobile. The plaintiff, in these chses, has been actually
touched by his own automobile or by some object outside of his vehicle,
attempting to recover under the medical payments provision of the insurance
of the driver who struck him, unsuccessfully argued that the ultimate impact
with the injuring vehicle was itself sufficient to constitute "occupying."
1107Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Service, Division 1
(c) Northwestern Natl Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Payments,
Division 1 (c).
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such as the road. The question of whether this plaintiff has been injured "through being struck by an automobile" continues to be asked,
probably because of the influence of two 1945 cases which both held for
the defendant-insurer. 168 In one of those cases the plaintiff argued that
he had been struck by his own automobile. 169 The court answered that
there was no "personal contact," that the concern was not with proximate cause and that the phrase: "means to be struck by an automobile
other than one in which one has the activity status of being a driver
of an excluded vehicle." 170 In the other case the court also stressed that
this was not a question of proximate cause but rather of simple unambiguous policy language. 7 1 The court succinctly reasoned: "It never
touched him."'172 With the exception of one unusual Texas case the
173
trend has clearly been away from this literal reasoning.
The cases which hold for the insured simply state that the phrase
7
must be given its common, usual, reasonable and ordinary meaning.1
Two cases have drawn an analogy to the tort of battery in which
"striking an object identified with the plaintiff" has the same juridical
effect as actually striking the plaintiff. 7 5 Finally, one case expresses
the common argument that the insurer could have explicitly limited
168 Johnston v. Maryland Cas. Co., 22 Wash. 2d 305, 155 P.2d 806 (1945) (an
automobile accident policy which read, "struck or run over by an automobile") ; Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Curry, 24 So. 2d 316 (Fla.

1945) (limited accident policy).
Johnston v. Maryland Cas. Co., 22 Wash. 2d 305, 155 P.2d 806 (1945).
170 155 P.2d at 808. There was a very brief dissent at 808.
171 Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Curry, 24 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1945) (The
policy read, "struck by an automobile which is in motion under its usual
motive power." Id. at 317).
169

172

Id. at 318.

In Vaughn v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 397 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965),
the policy contained an exclusion for bodily injury, "sustained by the named
insured or a relative (1) while occupying an automobile owned by or furnished for the regular use of either the named insured or any relative, other
than an automobile defined as an 'owned automobile.'" The plaintiff came
squarely within this exclusion. The court refused to accept the plaintiff's
argument that the "through being struck by an automobile" provision meant
that the exclusion only applied to one-car wrecks. The policy was held not to be
ambiguous. Compare Vaughn with Hale v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 Tex. 65,
344 S.W.2d 430 (1961), and Cockrum v. Travelers Indem. Co., 420 S.W.2d
230 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
174 Labracio v. Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y., 66 N.J. Super. 216, 168 A.2d 682
(1961); Wright v. Beacon Mut. Indem. Co., 87 Ohio L. Abs. 178, 179 N.E.2d
547 (C.P. 1961) ; Carson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 84 Ohio L. Abs. 378,
169 N.E.2d 506 (C.P. 1960) ; Elrod v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 246 S.C. 129,
142 S.E.2d 857 (1965); Liberty Universal Ins. Co. v. Bodiford, 426 S.W.2d
583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
17- Labracio v. Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y., 66 N.J. Super. 216, 168 A.2d 682, 685
(1961) (This case terms this situation an "indirect striking." Id. at 683);
Carson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 84 Ohio L. Abs. 378, 169 N.E.2d 506,
510 (C.P. 1960). Dean Prosser has said of battery: "[The injured party's
interest in] the integrity of his person includes all those things which are in
contact or connected with it." W. PaossEs, LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 33 (3d
ed. 1964).
173
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recovery to actual physical contact.' 7 , It seems predictable that insureds
will win cases in this category despite the actual wording of the policy.
b.

Separated Part of Automobile Hits Plaintiff

5S

Figure 2.
In this situation the plaintiff was struck not by what can be loosely
termed the "entire" automobile, but rather by a separated part S,.
In a sense this problem involves again the definition of the term "automobile." Is S, an automobile? If the plaintiff had been struck by S,
absent S', would this constitute being struck? What if S and S1 were
somehow miraculously the same size? Where is the line to be drawn?
Fortunately the cases have been neither numerous nor complex.
There are two old cases with very scanty reasoning. One involved a
nut flying off a wheel ;77 the other involved an exploding tire, with
the tube and rim hitting the plaintiff.373 Both cases held for the defendant insurer. A fuller consideration of this issue was given in a
more recent case, Beagle v. Automobile Club Insurance Co. 79 The
plaintiffs in that case while spectators at a race track, were injured
when a wheel came loose from one of the racers. The plaintiffs recovered. The court said:
Certainly if the remainder of the automobile with only three
wheels had run off the track and injured some one, the Court
feels it would still be an automobile even though it had only
Labracio v. Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y., 66 N.J. Super. 216, 168 A.2d 682, 685
(1961). Analogously, the phrase "physical contact," as between automobiles,
has been used in uninsured motorist endorsements as a protection against
fraud involving the hit and run situation. Even this terminology has created
problems when there has been a chain accident, which has not yet arisen in
conjunction -with the phrase "through being struck by an automobile." See,
e.g., Inter-Insurance Exch. of the Auto Club of S. Cal. v. Lopez, 238 Cal.
App. 2d 441, 47 Cal. Rptr. 834, 836 (1966) ; Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp. v. Eisenberg, 18 N.Y.2d 1, 218 N.E.2d 524, 271 N.Y.S.2d 641
(1966); Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 70 Wash. 2d 587, 424
P. 2d 648, 649 (1967).
1'77 Harley v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn., 40 Ga. App. 171, 149 S.E. 76 (1929);
"A nut, flying off of an automobile, is not an automobile or a substantial
portion thereof." 149 S.E.2d at 76. The court seemed sure that if the nut
was lying in the street, the plaintiff surely could not win. The fact that there
was grave doubt whether the plaintiff could prove the nut came off the car
probably hurt his case. The plaintiff was the only witness. The case involved
a pedestrian policy with no important language differences.
178 Enyon v. Continental Life Ins. Co. of Mo., 252 Mich. 279, 233 N.W. 228
(1930) (also involving a pedestrial policy).
17 86 Ohio L. Abs. 67, 176 N.E.2d 542 (C.P. 1960).
176
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three wheels. The Court can see no difference in principle
between
such a situation and the situation that we have in this
80
case.1
The plaintiff-insured actually lost the case because the court held that
the entire vehicle, a racing car, was not covered by the insurance
policy. It would seem that another argument that a plaintiff could
make in such a case is that a person is always struck by only a part
of a vehicle, such as the left front bumper or the four wheels. The only
real difficulty is that in these cases there is a detachment before the
striking.
'Two other old cases which are somewhat analogous will be discussed under this category. In one,' 8 ' a pedestrian was struck in
the eye by a wire which was wound around some pipes being transported by a truck. The wire was not attached to the truck in any
way, but only to the load. The ultimate question was whether being
struck by the load was equivalent to being struck by the vehicle itself.
The court, holding for the insurer, said:
The load is that which is deposited when the destination is
reached. The vehicle is what comes back. It is not conceivable
that a load of watermelons or chickens could, except by a most
strained construction, be regarded as a part of the truck itself.
If one having purchased a truck, upon going to get it, found it
loaded with brick, would it ever occur to him that the brick
were included in the purchase? If a driver was told to ascertain
the weight of a vehicle, would any, but an imbecile, drive the
loaded truck upon the scale ?182
It must be emphasized that this is a 1933 case by an intermediate
appellate court dealing merely with a precursor of the medical payments provision. 8 3 It is discussed because it illustrates the problems
which could arise under the medical payments provision. It poses
the question whether one would be able to recover his medical expenses
under the medical payments provision of his automobile liability policy
if a watermelon flew off a passing truck and struck him in the head.
84
A second old case, Gilbert v. Life & Casualty Co. of Tennessee,1
involved a cable. Unlike the wire in the previous case, however, the
180 176 N.E.2d at 543-44.

181 Brown v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn., 146 So. 332 (La. Ct. App. 1933).
182

Id. at 335.

"Industrial Travel and Pedestrian Policy" which read
(Id. at 333) : "If insured shall be struck by actually coming in physical contact
with a vehicle itself, and not by coming in contact wiith some object struck
and propelled against the person by said vehicle." The fact that the premiums
on these policies were very low may have influenced the court. Id.
184 185 Ark. 256, 46 S.W.2a 807 (1932). This case also involved a pedestrian
policy which read: "If the insured shall be struck by a vehicle .... ." Id.
at 808. The case hinted that there would be recovery regardless of what was
183 The case involved an

attached to the vehicle and whether it served some functional purpose. Id.
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cable was attached to the vehicle as a device for pulling out tree stumps.
The court held that being struck by the cable was no different from
being run over by the vehicle. What. a modern court would do with
these wire cases or with the cases in kvhich a part of the automobile
actually becomes separated is speculative. What is an "automobile"
is the surface issue.
c. Object Hits Plaintiff.

Figure 3.
In this situation there are actually two strikings. After S comes in
physical contact with the object, the object comes in physical contact
with the plaintiff. This could be, for instance, a chain accident in
which the object is not an "automobile" within the policy as, for
example, a motorcycle. Has the plaintiff been struck by S?
The insured has been successful in those cases which use the
typical policy language. 1 5 Since the insurer could make the provision
clearer it is construed against him. 8 6 One case which the insurer did
win, Patin v. Life & Casualty Insurance Co. of Tennessee,1 8 7 involved
a policy which was written by a scrivener who was clearly aware of
the problems in the area. The policy read, in part: "If the injured
shall be struck by actually coming in physical contact wuith the vehicle
itself and not coming in contact with (1) some object loaded on or
(2) attached thereto, or (3) some object struck and propelled against
the person by said vehicle . ... - This language was an attempt to

anticipate cases relating to the previous category (dealing with a
separated part of the automobile), this category (automobile knocks
down object), and the next category (automobile causes object to fly). 89
185

Black v. Hanover Ins. Co., 30 Misc. 2d 1081, 220 N.Y.S.2d 168 (N.Y. Mun.
Ct. 1961) (object was a pole); McKay v. Travelers Indem. Co., 94 Ohio
L. Abs. 1, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 76, 193 N.E.2d 431 (Ct. App. 1963) (object was a

building containing glass and canned goods) ; DiMartino v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 201 Pa. Super. 142, 192 A.2d 157 (1963) (object was a wall).
181 DiMartino v. State Farm. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 201 Pa. Super. 142, 192 A.2d
157, 159 (1963).
18 45 So. 2d 218 (La. Ct. App. 1950).
8
'1 Id. at 220 (emphasis added).

9
18
In addition to having a strictly drafted policy (an industrial and pedestrian

policy), the case had, from the plaintiff's viewpoint, weak facts. The insured
was killed when a ditch in which he was working caved in due to vibration of the ground caused by a passing automobile.
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d. Flying Object Hits Plaintiff.

Figure 4.

The only difference between these facts and Figure 3 is that the first
of the two strikings causes the object to fly before it strikes the
plaintiff. They are generically the same fact situation.
As in the previous category there is no actual physical touching
between the striking vehicle and the plaintiff. In three cases the flying
object was a plank placed under the vehicle to provide traction. Both
cases which held for the insurer simply stated that the plaintiff was
struck by a board, not an automobile, and that the policy was not
ambiguous. 190
The third traction plank case, which held for the insured, ignored
the literal language of the policy and delved into the world of tort
causation.' 9' The court held:
The blow inflicted upon the insured as a result of his being
struck by the piece of timber hurled at him was the efficient and
proximate cause of his injury and death; and the fact that he was
struck by the piece of timber hurled at him by the moving car
instead of by some part of the moving vehicle seems immaterial.
The agency which inflicted the blow was the moving vehicle,
192
against blows from which he had contracted for idemnity.
This appears to be a broadening of the literal language but at least
the court is helpful enough to state its reasoning rather than merely
finding ambiguity and construing against the insurer.
Two other old cases were found in which objects smaller than
planks were hurled. One is the Harley case,'19 3 discussed in the category dealing with a separated part of the automobile striking the
plaintiff. Harley indicated that there could be no recovery for injuries
caused by a nut propelled off the ground by an automobile. The other
19OGant v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. of Chattanooga, 197 N.C. 122, 147
S.E. 740 (1929) (This case involved an accident policy with a schedule of payments like workmen's compensation. It read, "struck, run down or run over by
a moving automobile." Id.) ; Quinn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 238
S.C. 301, 120 S.E.2d 15, 17 (1961) (relied heavily on Gant).
191 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 242 Miss. 38, 133 So. 2d 288 (1961).
192 133 So. 2d at 290; see also the dissent in Quinn v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 301, 120 S.E.2d 15, 20 (1961).
193 Harley v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn., 40 Ga. App. 171, 149 S.E. 76 (1929);
see 10 U.S.C. § 6203 (1964).
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case, Maness v. Life & Casualty Co. of Tennessee, specifically rejected Harley. The object was a rock. The reasoning was quite similar
to that in the third traction plank case, State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Johnson,195 which had relied on Maness heavily. It
was held that "the agency which inflicted the blow" was the automobile. 96 Although Maness is a 1930 case not dealing with the medical
payments provision, which did not then exist, it was still very influential thirty-one years later.
e. Must Plaintiff be Struck by Automobile?

Figure 5.
In both cases found by the authors there was no question that
there was a striking; the issue of physical touch did not arise. The
problem is that what has been termed in these diagrams the "striking"
vehicle was not the striker. The arrows point in the opposite direction.
The key word would appear to be "by" rather than "struck." In
Foundation Reserve Insurance Co. v. McCarthy,9 7 a motorcycle ran
into a moving automobile. The court relied on Webster to supply the
law.
[The word "by"] has various meanings depending upon the
intention and purpose of its use. Webster's Dictionary, [Third
New International,] among other definitions gives the meaning
as: "through", "through the medium of", "through the means
of", "in consequence of." We think that the phrase is . . . ambiguous.198
Whenever a court finds an ambiguity in the insurance contract the
insured recovers. This case was no exception.
In the only other case directly considering this issue a bicycle ran
into a parked vehicle.' 9 This case, holding for the insurer, probably
construed the policy more in line with its ordinary meaning. The in'19

161 Tenn. 41, 28 S.W.2d 339 (1930)
as in Harley).

(accident insurance policy, same insurer

242 Miss. 38, 133 So. 2d 288 (1961).
196 Maness v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn., 161 Tenn. 41, 28 S.W.2d 339, 340
(1930).
'7 77 N.M. 118, 419 P.2d 963 (1966).
19 419 P.2d at 964; see also the dissent in Quinn v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
'95

Co., 238 S.C. 301, 120 S.E.2d 15, 20 (1961).

109 Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kahn, 359 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. 1962), reversing

355 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
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sured did not recover because the automobile was not the "striking
20
force," or the "causation force," but rather merely a "passive vehicle."
f. Must Automobile be Propelled by Its Own Motive Power?
In Dean v. American Fire & Casualty Co.,20 1 a jack collapsed while
the plaintiff was attempting to remove it from under an automobile.
The automobile fell, injuring the plaintiff. Was he struck by an automobile within the meaning of the medical payments provision of the
automobile liability policy? The defense argued, taking a hint from
old-fashioned "pedestrian" policies, that the policy contemplated "forward or backward movement while being propelled under its own
motive power." 20 2 The court did not agree.
The word "struck" is the past tense of the word "strike" which
in its plain, ordinary and popular sense means "to hit with some
force"; "to come in collision with"; "to give a blow to"; "to
come into contact forcibly". . . . Here, the falling automobile
2 03
with the causitive force bringing about the appellant's injury.
The court, purporting to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the word,
held for the insured.
Two cases in this category, spanning over thirty years, each involved
an exploding tire. The insured lost in both cases. 20 4 In the more
recent case the plaintiff was changing a wheel. While he was replacing
a missing bolt the tire exploded, causing the tire and part of the wheel
to strike the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought action against his medical
payments insurer. The court, as did the court in the Dean case, purported to discern the common meaning of the policy:
[W]e conclude that the parties to the insurance contract intended
that plaintiff was to be insured against the usual injuries from
an automobile (or trailer in this case) resulting from being
struck, run into or run down by the vehicle, and that there
was no intent to provide coverage for the unusual type of accident
which occurred here, where20 the
trailer did not in any way parti5
cipate in causing the blow.
There was a dissent in which the judge would not have exculpated
the insurer unless his policy had read "struck by an entire automobile
in motion.' '200
In the above three cases there was some movement by the automo200 359 S.W.2d at 893.

201249 S.C. 39, 152 S.E.2d 247 (1967).
202

152 S.E.2d at 248.

203

Id. at 248-49.

204

Bowab v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 152 So. 2d 66 (La. Ct. App.
1963); Enyon v. Continental Life Ins. Co. of Mo., 252 Mich. 279, 233 N.W.
228 (1930)

205 152 So.
206

Id.

(a pedestrial policy).

2d at 71.
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bile. In Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Kahn, 0 7 previously
discussed in conjunction with the word "by," a bicycle ran into a parked
automobile. There was no movement at all one the part of the unoccupied automobile. The court held for the insurer since the "movement
and propulsion" of the automobile was not a factor in the collision. 2 0 9
In summary, the words "through being struck by an automobile"
have caused a variety of close cases. The only way to predict a result
is to classify the case in question with othter similar fact situations,
keeping carefully in mind the danger involved in each word.
6. Permission
The medical payments provision of the automobile liability policy
commonly covers bodily injury to the named insured and each relative:
"[W]hile occupying a non-owned automobile, but only if such a
person has the permission of the owner to use the automobile and the
use is within the scope of such permission. ' 20 9 The difficulty with
this wording is the meaning of "permission." Generally speaking,
some courts have given a liberal and others a strict interpretation
of the term. All of the cases found deal with the so-called "second
permittee problem."
210

The liberal view is illustrated by Loffler v. Boston Insurance Co.,

where a father permitted his son to use the car for a date, specifically
instructing not to let anyone else drive. The boy let his date drive. She
was the so-called second permittee. The court held that:
[T]he car was being used by the insured's son for the very purpose for which permission had been granted. He did not, by
the mere act of turning the wheel over to his companion, convert
the automobile to a different use. He did not become a mere
piece of supine cargo: he was still using it for "dating" purposes,
only the driver being changed. While it is true that a car cannot
be operated without being used, the converse is not true. We
must decline to hold the automobile was not in a permitted use
at the time of the tragic accident 2 1'
The girl was also allowed to recover. The court relied on cases which,
while not involving the medical payments provision, discussed the word
"permission" in other insurance contexts. The concept is not peculiar
to the medical payments provision. The court advised the insurer that
207359 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. 1962), reversing 355 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Civ. App.

1962); see text accompanying Maryland Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 289 S.W.2d
652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956), found in footnote 35.

208 359

S.W.2d at 893.

209 Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., Coverage C-Medical Services, Division 1 (b);
Northwestern Nat'1 Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Payments, Division 1 (b) (emphasis added).
120 A.2d 691 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 1956).
211Id. at 693 (emphasis added).
210
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it would not have such difficulties if it would insert the verb "operate"
for "use" in the provision.212
Not all cases on permission and the medical payments provisions
have been so generous to second permittees. For example, in Schultz
v. Tennessee Farmers Muttual Insurance Co.,213 a mother lent her
automobile to her son for him to use at college. She had no knowledge
that any person other than her son had used the car. The son allowed
a college friend to drive the automobile. The plaintiff in the case was
a passenger in the car while the college friend was driving. The court
held for the insurer, following cases construing the permission concept
in non-medical payments insurance cases. A second permittee was not
covered unless there was some express or implied permission given
by named insured to the second permittee. An example of implied
permission would be the permission given to a garage repairman.2 14 In
order to predict the result in these cases one must determine whether
the concept of permission has been viewed liberally or strictly in the
jurisdiction. One must also discover what specific instructions were
given to the first permittee.
C. DIVISION Two:

PAYMENTS TO OTHER PERSONS

"Division Two" is that language of the medical payments provision
which affords coverage to certain other persons who are neither named
insureds nor relatives of named insureds. The analysis of Division
Two coverage will be limited to a comparison of the coverage provided
"all other persons" and the coverage provided to the named insured
and relatives in Division One. No cases have been discovered which
deal with the particular problems posed by the language used in this
portion of the provision. Generally speaking, the language of Division
One is the same in most policies. Because the language of Division
Two differs from policy to policy two examples of this division will
be given. The significant differences in the two policies are noted by
italics.
In both of the examples coverage is extended to "all other persons"
but is in fact qualified by the requirement that they be occupying an
automobile. If injury occurred in an "owned automobile," recovery
is predicated on use of the automobile at the time of the accident by
the named insured or any other person having the permission of the
named insured. Additionally, Example A affords coverage to a person
212 Id.; Butterfield v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 83 Idaho 79, 357 P.2d 994 (1960),
is a similar case except there was no special restriction, i.e., there was general

permission. See also American Fire & Cas. v. Glanton, 182 So. 2d 36 (Fla.
Ct.. App. 1966), which also gives the hint to the insurer that the verb "operation" should be put in the place of "use."

213 218
214404

Tenn. 465, 404 S.W.2d 480 (1966).
S.W.2d at 480; see also Rakestraw v. Allstate Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 217, 119

S.E.2d 746 (1961), for another case involving the strict rule.
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Example A.
Division 2. To or for any other person who sustains bodily injury, caused
by accident, while occupying
(a) the owned automobile, while insured, by any resident of the same
household or by any other person
with the permission of named
insured, or
(b) a non-owned automobile, if the
bodily injury results from
(1) its operation or occupancy by

the named insured or its operation on his behalf by his

private chauffeur or domes-

tic servant, or
(2) its operation or occupancy by
a relative provided it is a
private passenger automobile
or trailer,
but only if such operator or occupant

Example B.
Division 2. To or for any other person who sustains bodily injury, caused
by accident, while occupying
(a) the owned automobile, while being
used by the named insured or by
any other person with the permission of the named insured; or
(b) a non-owned automobile, if the
bodily injury results from its operation or occupancy by the named
insured or its operation on his
behalf by his private chauffeur or
domestic servant but only if such
operator or occupant has the per-

mission of the owner to use the
automobile and the use is within
the scope of such permission!"

has, or reasonably believes he has the

permission of theowner to use the
automobile and the use is within the
scope of such permission!'
injured by an owned automobile while being used by any resident ot
the named insured's household, regardless of whether the resident has
permission to use the vehicle. It is important to remember that negligence plays no part in the recovery.
The coverage for one operating a "non-owned automobile" is more
narrow. When occupying a non-owned automobile one must also be
prepared to prove the injury results from the operation or occupancy
of the automobile by the named insured or by its operation on his
behalf by his private chauffeur or domestic servant. Again negligence
plays no part in recovery. The words "result from" indicate only that
the insured's conduct relates to the injury. As in the case of "owned
automobiles" the coverage under Example A is broader than that
under B. A also affords coverage when the injury results from the
operation or occupancy of a non-owned automobile by a relative.
The major distinction between Division Two and Division One is
that under the former the injured party must be an occupant of an
automobile (owned or non-owned) whereas there is coverage under
Division One even if the injured party is not an occupant but is merely
"struck by an automobile." Any further comment on Division One and
its relationship to Division Two must await court interpretation.
215

Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Payments, Division
2.

216 Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Services, Division 2.
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SET-OFF OF MEDICAL PAYMENTS AGAINST LIABILITY OF
TORTFEASOR-INSURED

This section investigates the question of whether sums disbursed
under the medical payments provision, providing coverage regardless
of fault, may be deducted by a tortfeasor-host or his insurer from
the amount awarded an injured passenger in an action based on the
host's negligence. At its inception, the medical payments provision was
intended to be a credit to the named insured in the event he was liable
in tort to a passenger, that is, any payments made to a passenger
should accordingly reduce the liability of the insured for such injury.218
However, such intent was not initially expressly incorporated into the
insurance contract. Early decisions interpreting the medical payments
provision allowed a guest to recover his medical expenses twice-once
under the medical payments provision of his host's policy and again
under the liability coverage in a tort action based on the host's negligence.2 19
Faced with the prospect of double recovery, some insurers incorporated provisions into their policies to the effect that any amount
payable under the liability coverage of the policy will be reduced by
22
payments made to such person under the medical payments provision. 1
As will be illustrated, this obviates the problem of double payment
217 For another treatment of the same topic, see Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 1115 (1967).
218 See Katz, Automobile Medical Payments Coverage-A Changing Concept?,
28 INs. CouNslL. J. 276 (1961), for a more detailed history of the development of medical expenses coverage.219 See, e.g., Pettey's v. Bullard, 269 App. Div. 919, 57 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1945).
220 A typical example of such a provision, taken from the Milwaukee Mut. Ins.
Co. Policy, reads:
[P]rovided that no such payment shall be made under Division 1 or
Division 2 unless the person to or for whom such payment is made
shall have executed a written agreement that the amount of such payment shall be applied toward the settlement of any claim, or the satisfaction of any judgment for damages, entered in his favor, against any
insured because of bodily injury arising out of any accident to which
the liability coverage applies.
The exact language of these provisions is very important. Financial responsibility acts have been utilized by some, courts recently to invalidate "other
insurance" provisions of uninsured motorist indorsements. For example, see
Sellers v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 185 S6. 2d 689 (Fla. 1966). See
also Pouros, Multiple Uninsured Motorist Coverage Under More Than One
Policy, Defense Memo, 10 For The Defense No. 8 (Oct. 1969). If the
medical payments set-off provisions are not carefully worded they may suffer
a similar fate. It is necessary that the provision does not reduce the statutorily mandatory bodily injury coverage, but rather reduces only the nonmandatory medical payments coverage. An example of a provision which has
successfully withstood this public policy attack is found in Caballero v.
Farmers Ins. Group, CCH AuTo INS. L. f[ 6324, 9041-2 Ariz. App. June 20,
1969).
"(1) Expenses Actually Incurred. 'Expenses
actually incurred' means
expenses for medical services . . . in excess of those paid or payable
to or on behalf of any person . . . (b) as damages under Part I [the
Bodily Injury Liability coverage] . .. and all payments made to or on
behalf of any person under this Part III [Medical Payments Provision]
shall be deemed to have been advanced under the coverage afforded
by Part I . . . . (Emphasis by the Court.)"
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and alleviates the increased costs for both the insurer and the insured.
Such a provision also obviates the problems which face thecourts in
arriving at a disposition of cases in which double recovery is sought
under policies lacking such a provisionIn the few cases in which double recovery has been sought under a
policy containing a set-off provision, the courts have given, effect to
the provision, finding an intent not to duplicate benefits. In the Louisiana case of Bowers v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co.,221 the plaintiff

had been paid the amount of her medical expenses by- the defendantinsurer. Notwithstanding this fact, the plaintiff contended she was
entitled to recover an identical amount under the general liability provisions o'f the policy. The court, relying on the set-off provision contained in the policy, refused to allow any medical expenses to be
included in the recovery of damages under the liability coverage.
Likewise, in Gunter v. Lord,222 the court held that the plaintiffs,
who had recovered their medical expenses under the medical payments
provision of their host's policy, were not entitled to recover the same
expenses in an action brought under the liability coverage of such
policy. The court analyzed the policy coverage carefully, noting the condition relating to medical payments coverage that payments made "shall
reduce the amount payable .hereunder for such injury." The court
denied a- double recovery of the guest's medical expenses, concluding:
We think the parties to the contract clearly intended coverage
C [medical expenses] to provide medical payments in all cases,
up to the stated limit, but, in the event of tortious conduct on
the part of the insured, that such payments would satisfy the
223
claim for damages normally awarded for those expenditures.
Absent such a provision relating to set-off against liability, the
courts have arrived at divergent conclusions as to whether an injured
guest may recover his medical expenses twice. The crucial elements
in the cases are the insurance contract of the tortfeasor and the intent
of the parties. Three cases illustrate this particularly well.
The lead case is Severson v. Milwaukee Automobile Insurance
Co., 224 a direct action against an automobile liability insurer to recover

under a medical expenses provision for damages previously recovered
in a tort action. The court held that where an automobile liability policy
contained a clause providing for payment of medical expenses of any
passenger in the insured's automobile who is accidentally injured and
where a separate premium was paid for such coverage, that the clause
constituted a separate agreement to pay under any circumstances. The
fact that the insurer had previously paid a judgment recovered by the
221 11 So. 2d 671 (La. Ct. App. 1960).
242 La. 943, 140 So. 2d 11 (1962).
140 So. 2d at 16 (emphasis added).
:24265 Wis. 488, 61 N.W.2d 872 (1953).
222
222
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plaintiff in a tort action arising out of the negligent operation of the
automobile did not relieve the insurer of its liability to the plaintiff
under the medical payments provision. The insurer had argued that
it was not the intention of the parties to the policy that medical expenses be paid twice to any injured person. The court answered:
"[The medical expenses provision] is an absolute agreement to assume
or pay the medical payments. Had the defendant intended to exclude
medical payments under coverage K if the same were paid or required
to be paid under Coverage A [liability], it could easily have so pro225

vided."
In Moorman v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,2 26 the issue was

whether the plaintiff was entitled to a recovery of her medical expenses under the medical payments provision. She had already received payment for her damages in a tort action against the operator
of the insured automobile. The court resolved this issue in the affirmative, noting that where there are separate coverages in an automobile
liability policy, with separate premiums for each coverage, a separate
and specific claim could arise under each coverage. The court continued: "We do not base our decision on the theory of one claim
sounding in tort and the other in contract. Our decision is based on
'
the provisions of the insurance policy before us. "227
In Beschnett v. FarmersEquitable Insurance Co.,228 the Minnesota

Supreme Court was faced with a release of a tortfeasor and a satisfaction by the insurer, pursuant to the terms of a liability policy. The
issue was whether a verdict which included medical expenses would
bar the plaintiff from again recovering those expenses in a separate
action against the insurer under the medical payments provision of the
same policy. The court held that where the insurer is neither named
in the release nor otherwise expressly relieved of further obligation by
it, a party is not thereby barred from bringing a subsequent action to
recover medical payments provided by the policy. The court, in allowing double recovery, repeated the following argument from an opinion
it cited with approval:
"This question leads to another equitable problem: is the insurer
obtaining a double benefit? . . . Two distinctive forms of pro-

tection have been supplied for two fees, and yet one payment
here will relieve both obligations. This possibility of double
charge-single payment is even more unwarranted than what this
plaintiff might
receive as a possible no charge-double recovery
229
bonanza.1

265 Wis. at 493, 61 N.W.2d at 875.
Va. 244, 148 S.E.2d 874 (1966).
227 148 S.E.2d at 876.
228 275 Minn. 328, 146 N.W.2d 861 (1966).
229 146 N.W.2d at 865.
225

226207
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In these three cases, Severson, Moorman and Beschnett, the plaintiff
recovered from the tortfeasor and then brought an action against the
host's insurer under the medical payments provision. The courts have
turned to the policy language and have uniformly allowed a double
recovery by gleaning intent from an analysis of the provisions.
A second situation occurs when the injured guest is paid his medical expenses under his host's medical payments .provision and then
seeks to recover them again in a negligence action against his host.
A good deal of confusion has arisen in these cases from the notion
that the answer to the question of set-off is to be found in the collateral
source rule. An analysis of the cases in this area will bear this out.
The cases which have denied a double recovery have done so on the
theory that payments from a tortfeasor, or from a fund created by
him (in these instances, his medical payments coverage) may be shown
to mitigate recovery. To hold otherwise would be an offense to the
collateral source rule and to equity. Thus, in Yarrington v. Thornburg,2 3 0 the court held that the tortfeasor was entitled to a credit, in
reduction of damages, for medical payments made to an injured guest
under the tortfeasor's policy. Speaking of the collateral source rule,
the court said: "The doctrine, however, does permit the tortfeasor to
obtain the advantage of payments made by himself or from a fund
created by him; in such an instance the payments 31come, not from a
2
collateral source, but from the defendant himself."
232
In Dodds v. Bucknum, an injured passenger was denied recovery
of her medical and hospital expenses in a tort action against her host.
The court noted that they had already been paid for under the medical
payments provision of the host's policy. In allowing the credit, the
court noted that it made no dtfference that the payment did not come
out of the host's own pocket or from insurance purchased by him since
it would be unjust to penalize a tortfeasor who had enough foresight
to provide such a fund throtigh insurance. The court concluded: "It
should therefore logically follow that if a wrongdoer provides a source
or fund out of which the injured party's special damages are paid
233
prior to trial the recovery of plaintiff is diminished to that extent."
A New York court in Moore v. Leggette,2 4 held that the collateral
source rule has no application where the tortfeasor himself had procured insurance for the benefit of the injured party. It concluded that
there should be a "reduction in damages to the extent that these have
,,235
already been defrayed by such policy ....
230 205 A.2d 1 (Del. 1964).
2311d. at 2.
232 214 Cal. App. 2d 206, 29 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1963).
23329
23424

Cal. Rptr. at 397.

App. Div. 2d 891, 264 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 864, 222
N.E2d 737, 276 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1966).
235 264 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
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In each of these three cases denying double recovery, the court did
not examine the provisions of the policy, but relied on the fact that
the tortfeasor created the insurance fund. It is worthy of note that in
both Yarrington236 and Dodds,237 the courts sought to distinguish
Severson,238 the lead case for double recovery, on the basis that in
Severson the action was directly against the insurer, thus intimating
that direct interpretation of the policy involved was the determining
factor in that case. But should not interpretation of the policy also be
determinative in an action against the tortfeasor?
In only one case did the court purportedly interpret the intent of
the parties to the contract and arrive at the conclusion that there could
not be a double recovery under both the liability and medical payments
provisions. But in that case, Tart v. Register,239 the court stated that
neither the insurance policy nor its provisions were before it. The
court admitted: "If double recovery can be had when [the tortfeasor]
is insured, it is not by reason of one claim sounding in tort and the
other in contract, as suggested, but solely by reason of the provisions
of the insurance contract."' 240 Yet in the next breath the court, in the
absence of the policy, said, that: "In our opinion it was not within the
contemplation of the contracting parties that there should be a double
recovery of medical expenses.

241

On the other hand, some courts have allowed the plaintiff to recover in a tort action against his host after receiving identical medical
damages from the host's insurer. Each of these courts reached this
conclusion after an examination of the policy involved.
In Long v. Landy,242 the plaintiff had collected her medical expenses under her husband's policy and sought the same damages in tort
from his estate. The plaintiff argued that the estate should receive
credit for the insurance fund since the tortfeasor had paid the premiums. The court replied that under the policy the plaintiff was a direct
contractual beneficiary. It concluded: "The contractual right is separate and distinct from any right [the plaintiff] may have to recover
for the quantum of damages sustained by her from the independent
tortious act of her husband. The two should not be confused.

243

In Edmonson v. Keller,244 the plaintiff was awarded damages in a
tort action for medical and hospital expenses which had already been
paid under the medical expenses provision of the defendant's policy.
205 A.2d 1, 3 (Del. 1964).
393, 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
61 N.W.2d 872 (1953).
239 257 N.C. 161, 125 S.E.2d 754 (1962).
236

237 29 Cal. Rptr.
23s265 Wis. 488,
240

125 S.E.2d at 764 (emphasis added).

241 Id.

N.J. 44, 171 A.2d 1 (1961).
171 A.2d at 7.

24235
243
244

401 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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On appeal, the defendant contended that payment for such expenses
under the liability provision of the contract was excused. The court
rejected this argumeent and also the application of the collateral source
rule, citing the Severson2 5 case as authority. The court accordingly
denied a credit for medical expenses payments.
In Blocker v. Sterling,40 the plaintiffs recovered an award against
their host which included their medical expenses. These expenses had
previously been paid by the host's insurer under his medical expenses
coverage. The defendant-host argued that the collateral source rule
should not apply since defendant had created the insurance fund and
that the parties had not intende'd that there be a double recovery
of -medical expenses. The court, relying heavily on Moorman v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,247 held that since there were two

separate premiums and two separate coverages,'there could be recovery
under each separate undertaking. The court noted that the insurer
"provided

no . . . exclusion to indicate that the payments under the

medical expenses coverage should not be in addition to payments under
liability coverage.

' ' 24

In summary, double recovery has been denied in, (1) those cases
in which a set-off clause is involved and, (2) in some of the cases in
which no set-off clause is involved and the plaintiff has first recovered
from the insurer and then brings an action against the tortfeasor. On
the other hand some of the cases in situation (2) have allowed double
recovery, as have cases in which the plaintiff has recovered from the
tortfeasor-host and then brings an action against the tortfeasor's insurer.
One source in attempting to resolve the question of whether double
recovery should be allowed where a set-off clause is lacking, cogently
stated what appears to be the preferable approach:
In this connection, however, the apparent right of the tortfeasor
and his insurer to contract for such coverage as they see fit must
not be overlooked. Since the law in most states requires no
medical payments coverage at all, it is evident that the claimant's rights must be measured to a large extent by the particular
language of the individual policy, and while some courts properly approach the question as one calling for construction of the
policy language, others seem to erroneously have assumed that
they were
free to adopt one view or another regardless of the
24
contract.

245 265 Wis. 488, 61 N.W2d 872 (1953).
246251 Md. 55, 246 A.2d 226 (1968).
247207 Va. 244, 148 S.E.2d 874 (1966).
24s
240

246 A.2d at 230.

Annot., supra note 217, at 1117: Another area where insurers have attempted

to prevent double recovery involves uninsured motorist coverage as well as
medical payments provision. The "Limits of Liability" condition of the 1963
Countrywide Uninsured Motorist Endorsement contains the following subsection which did not appear in the 1956 endorsement:
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III. EXCLUSIONS
Relatively few cases were found on the exclusions to the medical
payments coverage. Rather than discuss all of the exclusions, which
would necessitate a mere recitation of some of the policy language,
only those terms which have been litigated in the appellate courts will
be discussed.
A.

PUBLIC OR LIVERY CONVEYANCE

The first exclusion commonly stated that the policy does not apply
to bodily injury sustained while occupying "an owned automobile while
used as a public or livery conveyance. '250 In Spears v. Phoenix Insurance Co.,25 ' a station wagon was transformed into a funeral home ambulance. The court held that the medical payments provision applied.
"[T] he meaning of the phrase 'public or livery conveyance' means
the indiscriminate holding out of a vehicle for public use and
that in its broadest sense is intended to cover such vehicles as
taxicabs and buses which are used ordinarily for the purpose of
public conveyances, but it is likewise the opinion of the Court
that [it] is not limited to taxicabs or buses, but ...

includes the

using of any other vehicle where the operator uses the vehicle
as a means of conveying members of the public, usually for a
price, but without discrimination as to the persons within the
but indiscriminately for any
class of persons to be transported,
'252
who may call for such service.
The court relied on cases which discussed the exclusion as to non2 53
medical payments insurance.
Another case with a similar holding is McDaniel v. Glens Falls
Indemnity Co. 25 4 The plaintiff purchased an automobile and was going
(d) the company shall not be obligated to pay under this Coverage
that part of the damage which the insured may be entitled to recover
from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile which represents expenses for medical services paid or payable under the Medical
Payments Coverage of the policy.
This provision hafs been effective; see Damsel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 186 So. 2d 825 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966); Tuggle v. Government Employees
Ins. Co., 185 So. 2d 487 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966); Hack v. Great Am. Ins. Co.,
175 So. 2d 594 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965); Sims v. National Cas. Co., 171 So.
2d 399 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965) ; Connelley v. Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Co., 219
So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App. 1969); Morgan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
195 So. 2d 648 (La. Ct. App. 1967). One Florida case has held otherwise:
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Carrico, 200 So. 2d 265 (Fla. Ct. App.
1967). The court followed what it considered to be the mandate of the Florida Supreme Court in Sellers v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 185 So. 2d
689 (Fla. 1966). But that case was distinguishable because it involved the
"other insurance" provision of the uninsured motorist endorsement, rather
than the above-quoted subsection on limitation of liability.
25OMilwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Services, Exclusion
(a) (1) ; Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Payments, Exclusion (a) (1).
251 149 So. 2d 118 (La. Ct. App. 1963).
252
253
254

Id. at 121-22.
Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 273 (1953).
333 Ill. App. 596, 78 N.E.2d 111 (1948).
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to take a long trip to sell the vehicle. In response to an advertisement
soliciting people who were willing to transport others, she took three
paying passengers. The plaintiff, who was injured while so driving the
automobile, was allowed to recover. The exclusion did not apply. The
automobile was not used indiscriminately in conveying the public, but
was instead limited to this special occasion.
B.

FARm TYPE TRACTOR AND PUBLIC RoADs
Another exclusion is: "(b) . . . bodily injury sustained by the
named insured or a relative while occupying or through being struck
by (1) a farm type tractor . . . while not upon public roads .... ,,255
The case of Leski v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In.rance
Co., 25 6 which primarily involved a dispute as to whether an accident

site was a public road, explained the public policy behind this exclusion:
[T]he manifest underwriting intent was to exclude from coverage . . . the risks normally attending the operation of a farm

tractor in its ordinary place of usage ....
A description of the
ordinary place of usage would be in and about the fields and
premises of a farm ....
It seems clear that it intended to extend
the coverage to operation of a farm tractor in other than its
ordinary place of usage; in other words, in a type of operation
in which the tractor would be u6ed on the road257going to and
from farms or when used on the road for hauling.
In Leski, although a road was not yet officially opened to public travel,
people were often using it to reach a specific destination. It was held
that a "reasonable understanding ... by a layman" would include this
route as a public road 58 "Public roads" may mean more than some
insurers anticipated.
OTHER EQUIPmENT DESIGNED FOR USE OFF PUBLIC ROADS

C.

In addition to the "farm type tractor," there is also an exclusion
for injury to a named insured or relative while occupying or through
being struck by: "other equipment designed for use principally off
public roads, while not upon public roads .... ,259 Two cases have held
that other equipment does not mean only other farm equipment.2 60 It
Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Services, Exclusion
(b) ; Northwestern !kN'l Ins. Co Policy, Coverage C-Medical Payments,
Exclusion (b) (1); Wright v. Beacon Mut. Indem. Co., 87 Ohio L. Abs. 178,
179 N.E.2d 547 (C.P. 1961) (a tractor driven on a public road is clearly not
excluded).
258 367 Mich. 560, 116 N.W.2d 718 (1962).
257 116 N.W.2d at 721.
255

258

Id.

Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Service, Exclusion (b)
(1); Northwestern Nael Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Payments,
Exclusion (b) (1).
260 Beagle v. Automobile Club Ins. Co., 86 Ohio L. Abs. 67, 18 Ohio Op. 2d 280,
176 N.E.2d 544 (CY. 1960) (stock car); Williams v. Cimarron Ins. Co., 406
S.W.2d 173, 175 (Tex. 1966) (stock car, also).
259
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comprehends, moreover, not only accossories, but entire vehicles.' 1
Furthermore, the original design of the vehicle is not determinative.
An automobile manufactured for normal use but later modified for
racing purposes is "designed for use principally off public roads."2 2
With the exception of the'"other insurance" exclusion, which will
be treated in the next section, these are the only exclusions found
which have been specifically construed in medical payments provision
cases. Some general terms which are integral to the medical payments
exclusions, for example, "automobile business," have been defined in
other automobile insurance contexts and there is little doubt that such
63
case law would carry over into medical payments coverage.1
D.

THE "OTHER INSURANCE" EXCLUSION

Some insurers, in order to eliminate duplication and to attain low
rate packages for their policyholders, have incorporated an "other
insurance" exclusion in their medical payments provision. Such exclusion generally applies:
"[T]o that amount of any expense for medical services which
is paid or payable to or for the injured person under the provisions of any (1) premises insurance affording benefits for
medical expenses, (2) individual, blanket or group accident,
disability or hospitalization insurance, (3) medical, surgical,
hospital or funeral service, benefit or reimbursement plan or,
(4) workmen's
compensation or disability benefits law or any
264
similar law.

This exclusion is aimed at cases like Kopp v. Home Mutual Insurance
Co.,265 in which the plaintiff had a hospitalization plan. The hospitaliza-

tion insurer reimbursed the hospital directly for services rendered
to the plaintiff. When the plaintiff sought to recover these expenses
under his medical payments provision, the insurer refused, claiming
the plaintiff had incurred no expense. The court allowed recovery. Had
the automobile policy contained an exclusion such as that quoted above,
this duplication of benefits would have been avoided.
Beagle v. Automobile Club Ins. Co., 86 Ohio L. Abs. 67, 18 Ohio Op. 2d 280,
176 N.E.2d 544 (C.P. 1960).
262 Id.; see also Beeler v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Ins. Co., 48
Tenn. App. 370, 346 S.W.2d 457, 461 (1960).
263 See, e.g., Piliero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 130, 209 N.Y.S.2d 90
(1960) (a volunteer parking attendant, subsisting on tips, not employed in
automobile business); Hammer v. Malkerson Motors, Inc., 269 Minn. 563,
132 N.W.2d 174 (1964) (car in hands of garage owner for repairs not used
in automobile business); Cherot v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 264
F.2d 767 (10th Cir. 1959) (distinguishes a hobby from an automobile business) ; Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 964 (1960).
264 Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage C-Medical Service, Exclusion
(g). See Rubin v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co., CCH Atro. INS. L. 1 6227 (N.Y.
App. Div. April 10, 1969) (held no double coverage even in absence of "other
insurance" exclusion).
265 6 Wis. 2d 53, 94 N.W.2d 224 (1959).
261
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More than twenty years ago, when the "other insurance" clause was
new, one author expressed the view that: "[I]t is not necessary for
the person to collect such benefits in order to be excluded from the
coverage.1266 Subsequent court decisions have established the rule that

the other benefits need only be payable in order for the exclusion to
operate.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Rice,i67 a suit
was brought for medical payments benefits against an automobile liability insurer by one who was struck by an insured automobile. At the
time of the accident, the plaintiff was employed and entitled to receive
workmen's compensation benefits. These benefits were refused for unstated reasons. The medical payments provision held that the policy
did not apply: "if benefits therefore are in whole or in part either
payable or required to be provided under any workmen's compensation law. ' 218
' The court held that where medical payments coverage
was thus expressly excluded, one who was injured by the insured
automobile and was also entitled to 'recover workmen's compensation
for those injuries could recover no benefits under the medical payments provision. This was true even though he received no workmen's
compensation for his injuries, and irrespective of whether his failure
to receive benefits was due to his refusal to accept them or due to
2 69
the refusal of his employer or the insurer to provide them.
In order for this exclusion to operate, the available benefits must
cover the same risk. That is to say: "[T]he exclusion has no application to other forms of insurance providing benefits that are not measured in terms of incurred medical expense, such as a weekly disability
270
benefit or specific indemnity for loss of life or limb."
In point is Northland Insurance Co. v. Milesy2 71 where the plaintiffdriver of a non-owned automobile sued the insurer of the owner of the
automobile under the owner's medical payments provision. The insurer
claimed coverage was excluded by the "other insurance" exclusion.
The policies of the plaintiff related to indemnity for loss of life, limb,
or sight, and for the loss of time due to accident injury. The court held:
It is clear beyond doubt that the policy sued on is a policy
for medical expense; and no coverage is excluded under [the
"other insurance" clause] except "medical expense" payments
266 Kluwin, Medical Payments Endorsement of Automobile Policies, 15 INS.
CouNclL J. 35, 37 (1948).
207 205 Tenn. 344, 326 S.W.2d 490 (1959).
268
209

326 S.W.2d at 491.
For other cases in which the operation of the exclusion depended on whether

other benefits were payable, see Bonney v. Citizens' Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 333

Mich. 435, 53 N.W.2d 321 (1952) ; Ruth v. Royal Indem. Co., 83 So. 2d 520
(La. Ct. App. 1955); and Shaver v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1956).
270 Katz, supra note 218, at 279.
271 446 P.2d 160 (Wyo. 1968).
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made under certain enumerated kinds of insurance. Other insurance benefits (aside from medical expense payments), such as
disability benefits, death benefits, annuity payments, or payments
to cover loss of earnings, may not be deducted by appellantinsurance company
in the settlement of its liability for medical
27 2
expense loss.

The court based its conclusion on the following reasoning:
There is no difference in principle between the excluding
of liability and the limiting of liability. The authorities are legion
that for a proportionate recovery clause to operate in the insurer's favor . . . there must be identity of risk ....

It follows from this that the exclusion we are dealing with
can be operative only as to insurance of a 2 7type
and kind re3
ferred to in the phraseology of the exclusion.
The court accordingly held the "other insurance' 'exclusion inapplicable.
IV. LIMIT OF LIABILITY
Medical services coverage is secured by the payment of a separate
premium. The size of that premium, of course, determines the amount
of coverage to which the insured is entitled. The amount of coverage
is typically referred to as the insurer's limit of liability, the insurer's
maximum exposure for any one injury. A medical payments provision
limit of liability clause generally reads: "The limit of liability for
medical services stated in the declaration as applicable to 'each person'
is the limit of the company's liability for all expenses incurred by or
on behalf of each person who sustains bodily injury as the result of
any one accident. ' 27 5 Since limitg of liability are contained in all parts
of the automobile liability policy, the problems presented by such clause
are not unusual. Therefore, this aspect of the medical payments provision will not be treated in depth.
However, one problem arises more than infrequently and demands
some detailed attention. Where more than one automobile is covered
under one policy and medical expenses coverage has been purchased
for each automobile, the question arises as to the amount of coverage
available. Most automobile policies state: "When two or more automobiles are insured hereunder, the terms of this policy shall apply
separately to each .... -276 What is the effect of this condition on the
limits of liability clause?
Id. at 161.
Id. at 161-62.
274 For other cases sustaining the view that the available benefits must cover the
same risk, see Pitts v. Glen Falls Indem. Co., 222 S.C. 133, 72 S.E.2d 174
(1952); Fogelmark v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 11 Ill.
App. 2d 551, 137
N.E.2d 879 (1956).
275 Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Limit of Liability.
276 Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Condition 4.
272

273
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The majority rule is that the amount of medical payments available
for each person injured is the coverage purchased multiplied by the
7

27
number of automobiles insured.

The lead case supporting the majority rule is Southwestern Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Atkins.27

8

An insured under the defendant-insurer's

medical payments provision was injured when struck by an automobile other than the two named in the policy. The stated limit of liability
was $500. The issue was whether under the terms of the policy $500
was the limit of recovery although the policy provided coverage on
two automobiles with premiums allocated to each sepearately. The
court noted that the limit would have been $1,000 had there been two
separate policies. It concluded:
[I]f he can collect only $500, he is no better off for having taken
out medical payments on both cars than on one car, since he
could recover the same amount had he taken out medical payments on only the one car.
In the present case we think [the limit of liability] provision
applies to each car separately and independently as provided in
the policy, and means that for each car the limit is $500, or a
total of $1,000 for the two cars. If the insurance company intended to limit the medical payments to the amount of $500
which a policy on only one car would provide, it should have
so stipulated in no uncertain language, and27 9it should not have
charged a pfemium on each car separately.
This construction creates a separate contract of insurance as to each
insured automobile and permits recovery rather than a forfeiture of a
20
benefit for which the insured had paid.

A California court reached the opposite conclusion in Sullivan v.
Royal Exchange Assurance,28 1 perhaps the earliest case on this specific
question. The plaintiff brought an action for declaratory relief to determine his rights under a policy of insurance. Two automobiles owned
by the plaintiff were covered by a policy issued to him by the defendantinsurer. Medical expenses coverage in the amount of $2,000 existed
on each of two automobiles owned by the insured, a separate premium
having been assessed on each. While the policy was in effect, the plainoF LIABILrrY INSURANCE § 8.09, at 8-20 (1969).
S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
2'7Id.
at 894-95.
80
2 For other cases following the majority rule, see Kansas City F. & M. Ins.
Co. v. Epperson, 234 Ark. 1100, 356 S.W.2d 613 (1962) (holding the policy
to be ambiguous and therefore to be construed against the insurer) ; Central
Sur. & Ins. Co. v. Elder, 204 Va. 192, 129 S.E.2d 651 (1963) (since the
continuation contract was given two interpretations, the court held for the
insured, saying: "It is reasonable to think that the additional premium
charged for the inclusion of a second car was intended to afford some corresponding benefit to the insured." 356 S.W.2d at 614).
251 181 Cal. App. 2d 644, 5 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1960).
277R. LONG, THE LAW

278 346
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tiff's son was struck by an automobile not covered by the policy and
sustained damages in excess of $4,000. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the limit of $2,000 should be appled separately
and individually to each automobile insured. The. court reasoned that
the condition regarding two automobiles and the limit of liability clause
were complementary and that the specific limitation provision regarding liability would prevail over the general condition regarding
two automobiles which applies to all parts of the policy. It should
be noted that in the Atkins and Sullivan cases the insured was injured
in an automobile other than one of those named in the policy.
Contrasting with the Atkins and Sullivan cases is Guillory v. Grain
Dealers Mutual Insurance Co., 2

2

where the plaintiff was injured while

occupying one of the two automobiles insured in the policy. The defendant-insurer paid its policy limits for medical expenses upon proof
of loss. When a supplemental proof for $370 was put in, liability was
denied, on the basis that the insurer's maximum exposure under the
circumstances had been paid. The court denied the plaintiff's claim
for a recovery on each automobile stating:
Had the plaintiff been involved in an accident while driving one
of his own vehicles upon which no medical payment clause had
been taken, then he would not have been entitled to recover
under the medical paymenfs clause reserved on another his own
vehicles because neither condition would have been presented,
i. e., he would not have been in an owned vehicle . . . and he
would not have been driving a non-owned vehicle. Thus, the
argument of the plaintiff that he would
be paying double pre283
miums for no good reason must fall.

This case illustrates what appears to be the better rule where the insured
28 4
is injured in one of the named automobiles.
V. OTHER INSURANCE
The "other insurance" clause of the medical payments provision of
an automobile policy is not distinctive.2 8 5 Since it creates no problems
203 So. 2d 762 (La. Ct. App. 1967).
Id. at 764. See also Odom v. American Ins. Co., 213 2d 359 (La. Ct. App.
1968) (six different vehicles were listed under the schedule of automobiles;
same circuit and same holding).
284 There are two cases which, unlike Guillory, have allowed double recovery
even though the injury was sustained while in a vehicle named in the
policy. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Sweet, 186 So. 2d 95 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1966) and Travelers Indem. Co. v. Watson, 140 S.E.2d 505 (Ga App.
1965). Both of these cases are distinguishable because the policies involved
do not contain the standard language that Guillory does.
Also, it should be noted that the possible interaction of the other insurance
clause with the various provisions discussed in these double coverage cases
has not yet been explored by the courts.
285 The Northwest Nat'l Ins. Co. Pi1icy's "other insurance" clause provides:
If there is other automobile medical payments insurance against a
loss covered by Part II of this policy the company shall not be liable
under this policy for a greater proportion of such loss than the applica-

282
283
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unusual to medical payments coverage, it will not be discussed at
length.286 •-Two cases will be used to illustrate the typical problems
presented when two medical payments provisions are applicable to the
same injuries.
In Vallaire v. Employers Lifbility Assurance Corp.,2 1 the plaintiff was injured while occupying a non-owned automobile. The host's
liability insurer paid its limits under its medical payments provision.
The plaintiff sought to recover the full amount of liability under his
mother's medical payments provision. The court held that the defendant-insurer was entitled to a credit for the plaintiff's medical
expenses received undei" the host's policy. In other words, fhe defendant's policy constituted surplus insurance. The excess clause of the
other insurance provision functioned to produce this result.
In Harkavy v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 288 the plaintiff was injured
in an automobile accident while a passenger of a host who had medical
payments coverage of $5,000. The plaintiff had $2,500 of medical
expenses. Ignoring her host's insurance, she settled with a third party
tortfeasor for $8,500 and then brought an action on her own medical
payments provision for the limits of $2,000. The insurer-defendant
denied coverage, relying on the "other insurance" clause. Her action
was dismissed because there was other valid and collectible automobile
medical expenses insurance on the automobile in which she was a
passenger. It afforded primary coverage. Her policy afforded only
excess coverage. Of course, not all of the cases have come to the
same result as these two.
VI. CONDITIONS
A.

GENERALLY

All of the coverages contained in the standard automobile liability
policy are affected by the conditions which form a part of the insuring agreement. The application of some of these conditions is exactly
the same whether recovery is being sought under the liability provisions, the medical payments provision, or any other part. Those conditions which determine whether the insurance policy was in force at
ble limit of liability stated in the reclarations hears to the total
applicable limit of liability of all valid and collectible automobile
medical payments insurance; provided, however, the insurance with
respect to a temporary substitute automobile or non-owned automobile
shall be excess insurance over any other valid and collectible automobile medical payments insurance.
28 For a discussion of the "other insurance" clause, see generally Watson, The
Other Insurance Dilemma, 16 FEDERATiON INS. COUNSEL Q. 47 (Summer

1966) and T. FORD, Concurrent Coverage Controversies, in
SURANCE PROBLEMS 59 (1968).

So. 2d 391 (La. Ct. App. 1965); see also Wyman v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
29 App. Div. 2d 319, 288 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1968).
220 Tenn. 327, 417 S.W.2d 542 (1967) ; see, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey Mfrs.
Indem. Ins. Co., 69 N.J. Super. 184, 174 A.2d 4 (1961) and Feltenstein v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 49 Misc. 2d 876, 268 N.Y.S.2d 673 (App. T. 1966).
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the time of the accident fall in this category. While they apply to the
medical payments provision their application poses no unique problem
within the scope of this article. It is sufficient to note that if the
policy itself has expired, has been cancelled, or has not been renewed,
then there can be no recovery under any part of the policy. Accordingly, only those conditions which have particular application to the
medical payments claimant will be discussed.
B. NOTICE

The "notice" condition 289 requires that the insurer be given written
notice of the particulars of the accident, including the names of the
injured and of available witnesses. The policies variously require this
notice be given "as soon as practicable,"2 90 or "as soon as reasonably
possible, '12

91

or "within 20 days.

' 292

There is no requirement that the

notice be submitted by the named insured or by any particular
individual; any person may give notice of the accident.
The notice condition most often becomes the subject of a medical
payments provision dispute because notice has been given late. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v.Margolis203 involved a
motion to consolidate two trials. One was an action by a passenger
seeking recovery under the medical payments provision of his host's
automobile insurance. The other was a declaratory judgment action
by the same insurer seeking a judgment of no coverage with the host
driver as defendant. The basis of the insurer's action was that no
notice of the accident was given until six months after the accident.
The motion to consolidate was granted, indicating that the six month
delay could also defeat the passenger's action for medical expenses.
In Henderson v. Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co., 294 there had been

a thirteen month delay in giving notice of the accident. The court
held that the delay was unreasonable and that it was to be presumed
prejudicial to the insurer. It was acknowledged that the presumption
was rebuttable but that the plaintiff seeking medical expenses had not
rebutted it under the facts present in the case.
A twenty month delay was the subject of litigation in Merchants

Mutual Casualty Co. v. Izor.2 95 The passenger of the insured had
slipped while alighting from the insured's automobile. At the time both

parties had treated the incident as a trivial mishap and neither party
saw fit to give the insurer notice of the accident. The insured did
give notice to the insurer just as soon as the passenger commenced
289
299

Milwaukee Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. Policy, Condition 3.
Northwestern Nat'l Auto. Ins. Co. Policy, Condition 3.

291 Milwaukee Mut. Auto Ins. Co. Policy, Condition 3.
292 Id.
293 116 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Special T. 1952).
294 252 Iowa 97, 106 N.W.2d 86 (1960).
295 118 Vt. 440, 111 A.2d 732 (1955).
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suit by service of summons upon the insured. Upon trial the insurer
raised the defense of late notice but the trial court felt this breach
should not affect the medical payments coverage. Upon appeal the
court held the breach of the notice requirement vitiated all coverages,
not just the liability portion of the policy. From these decisions it
appears that one seeking recovery under the medical payments provision should make certain that timely notice is given to the insurer.
Under the terms of the policy, notice must be given in writing,
in addition to being made as soon as practicable. 296 An oral notice to

an insurance agent is not sufficient. In Aetna Insurance Co. v. Durbin,

297

the claimant had been in touch with her agent by telephone

and in person. She had furnished all the information the agent
requested but she did not promptly notify the insurance company in
writing as the policy required. The first written notice was made
four months later by her attorney. Aetna disclaimed coverage because
of late notice, and the claimant countered maintaining written notice
was waived by the agent who had been satisfiied with her furnishing
the necessary information by telephone. The court, in allowing Aetna
to disclaim, held that that the agent's actions did not constitute a
waiver by the company of its requirement of written notice. While
the agent could not waive the written notice requirement, the condition
could have been waived by conduct of the company itself.2 8
In addition to making a timely written notice of the accident,
the condition also requires certain information about the accident, if
reasonably obtainable, such as the names and addresses of those
injured. In Caruso v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 2 9 9 medical
payments were denied because the notice, made the day after the
accident, made no mention of the insured suffering any injury in the
accident.
In conclusion, the notice condition requires written notice as soon
as practicable. The requirement is that this notice be "given by or
for insured." Thus, if the insured is not going to give notice, for
whatever reason, the burden of supplying the notice falls upon whomever might expect to benefit by the coverages provided.
C.

MEDICAL REPORTS:

PROOF AND PAYMENT OF CLAIMS

This condition 300 applies especially to those seeking recovery under
the medical payments provision. In a sense it is a grouping of three
conditions, (1) Medical Reports, (2) Proof of Claim, and (3) Pay299 Policies, supra notes 290 and 291.
417 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
297
298 See McCown v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 116 Ga App. 655, 158 S.E.2d 486

(1967), for an example of waiver of notice condition by insurer's actions.
2990 397 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).

3o Milwaukee Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. Policy, Condition 7; Northwestern Nat'l
Auto. Ins. Co. Policy, Condition 7.
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ment of Claim. While "notice" provides the insurer with timely
information, about the accident, this condition also makes available
to the ,insurer timely information about the injuries which will be
the basis for medical payments.
1. Medical Reports
The medical reports must be submitted "as soon as practicable."
In Allen v. Western Alliance Insurance Co., 3 0 1 107 days was held
not to be as soon as practicable. The insured had arrived at a
settlement with the other driver before making his claim for injury.
The -same result was reached when no claim was made until nine
months after the claimant had fallen in a supermarket.3 0 2 The supermarket case dealt with medical payments under a general liability
policy.
Another "as soon as practicable" case involved an insured who
first settled his liability claim with his own insurer, who also was the
insurer of the other vehicle involved in the accident. The facts in
30 3
inGordon v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America,
dicate that prompt notice of the accident had been made. In the
process of presenting his case for recovery under the liability policy
of the other driver, the insured had furnished his insurer with all
medical reports. He did not, however, notify the insurer that his
policy contained a medical payments provision until he won his verdict
in the liability case. The fact that Gordon had not advised his insurer
of the medical payments provision was held not to be prejudicial and
recovery was allowed.
2. Proof of Claim
The condition requires "written proof of claim, under oath if required." This means more than simply an oral discussion with an
adjuster and letters demanding settlement.3 0 4 On the other hand, where
the claimant had requested a formal claims form which was never
sent, the insurer was held liable. The court concluded that the insurer
had been furnished enough information upon which to base a settlement. 3 5 The policy gives the insurer the right to demand that claims
be stated under oath, but where the insurer fails to assert this right,
30 6
the requirement is dispensed with.
The condition requiring proof of claim obliges the insured to
execute authorizations to obtain medical reports and records. It also
requires the insured to submit to physical examination. 30 7 In Collins
201 162 Tex. 72, 349 S.W.2d 590 (1961).
302 Bowers v. Lumbernens Mut. Cas. Co., 131 So.
302
34

180 Pa. Super. 45, 117 A.2d 778 (1955).

2d 70 (La. Ct. App. 1961).

o Upshaw v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 112 So. 2d 125 (La. Ct. App. 1959).

305 Patterson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 131 So. 2d 147 (La. Ct. App. 1961).

so, Soirez v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 168 So. 2d 418 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
07
Jackson v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 41 111. App. 2d 300, 190 N.E.2d 490 (1963),
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v. FarmersInsuranceExchange,308 the claimant was allowed to recover
without executing all necessary authorizations. He had never refused
to execute them and the insurer had disclaimed on the basis that the
bodily injury had not been due to accident. By the time the insurer
made a request (at trial), there had ,not been time to sign all the
authorizations.
3. Payment of, Claim; Admission of Liability
The language of the condition permits the insurer to pay the injured
person or any person or organization rendering services. If someone
other than the injured person is paid, this will lower the amount recovered by the injured person. While this gives the insurer -the option
of whom it is going to pay, it is questionable whether a person rendering services has an enforceable right under the policy. Although an
injured person may assign whatever rights he has to the person or
institution that has ,cared for him, the coRsent of. the insurer might
be required to make the assignment bindingY°9
The payments made uxder the medical payments provision are
independent of liability coverage. The policy states that a payment
made under the Medical Expenses Provision shall not constitute an
admission of liability. This severance of coverages was demonstrated
in Cox v. Santoro310 where the payment made by the insurer for
medical expenses was held not to estop the insurer from denying
coverage under the liability portion of the policy. Mayflower Insurance Co. v. Osborne1 was another case in which the insurer was
able to disclaim liability (due to breach of the cooperation clause) for
the accident even though it had paid medical expenses arising out of
the same accident.

D. Two OR Mopm AUTOmOBILE
This condition 1 2 simply states that when two or more automobiles
are insured, the terms of the policy shall apply separately to each.
The effect of this language can be seen by examining the following
two fact situations.

held that an insurer was entitled to only one physical examination and that

submission of pro6f of claim in connection with liability claim was enough
to satisfy an insurer's requirements regarding medical payments claim.
308 271 Minn. 239, 135 N.W.2d 503 (1965).
309
See Milwaukee Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. Policy, Condition 15; Northwestern
Nat'l Auto. Ins. Co. Policy, Condition 15; Dallas County Hosp. Dist. v.
Pioneer Cas. Co., 402 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), held an assignment
of rights under the policy not to be binding on the insurer where no consent
to the assignment was given and where the insurer had already paid the
insured.
310 94 N.J. Super. 319, 228 A.2d 101 (1967).
311 326 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1964).
312 Milwaukee Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. Policy, Condition 4; Northwestern Nat'l Auto.
Ins. Co. Policy, Condition 4.
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In Hansen v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 3 23 the insured
had three automobiles insured and had medical payments coverage on
each. Only one recovery was allowed, even though three automobiles
were insured. In Cockrurn v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,3 14 there were
again three automobiles insured, but medical payments coverage was purchased for only one. It was held that the coverage on the insured automobile extended coverage to family members while driving the other
two automobiles. This conclusion was reached because Division One
covers the named insured and his relatives while occupying the owned
automobile or any non-owned automobile. If the definitions of "owned"
automobile and "non-owned" automobile (found in the liability part
of the policy) are read, i.t is difficult to determine on which the court
could grant recovery. The automobiles without medical payments
coverage could not be deemed "owned" since no premium charge was
made with respect to medical payments coverage. On the other hand,
the automobiles could not be deemed "non-owned," since they were
actually owned and regularly used by the named insured and his relatives. If the automobile in which the accident occurred was neither
"owned" nor "non-owned" with respect to medical payments coverage,
then no recovery should have been allowed.
Additional cases bearing on the effect of having two or more
automobiles insured have been previously discussed in conjunction
with the limits of liability clause, the interpretation of which is greatly
influenced by this condition. 3 5
E.

ACTION AGAINST COMPANY

The policy, as a condition precedent to any legal action against
the insurer, demands full compliance with all the terms of the policy.
With regard to medical payments claimants, this means the claimant
must have complied. Thus, no action will lie against the insurer for
medical expenses until a formal claim for medical payments has been
made and the insurer has refused to pay the claim.316
The condition does not demand, as a condition precedent to the
claimant's action, that the insured must have made full compliance.
In a case where the insured had breached the cooperation clause,
enabling the insurer to avoid liability coverage, the medical payments
claimant still had the right to an action for medical payments
coverage. 1 7
F. SUBROGATION
Under the medical payments provision, the insurer agrees to
313

314
315

316
317

116 Ga. App. 528, 157 S.E.2d 768 (1967).

420 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).

See cases cited in the section of this article, "Limit of Liability," p. 496.
McGlocklin v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 220 F. Supp 193 (E.D. La. 1963).
Diaz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 293 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1961).

199-70]

MEDICAL PAYMENTS -PROVISION

indemnify318 the insured for all reasonable medical and related expenses
within the stated limits. Some insurers have incorporated a subrogation provision into their medical services coverage. Such provision
generally requires that in cases where the insurer pays the expenses
of a person injured due to the negligence of a third party, the insurer
shall be subrogated to the injured party's right of recovery for such
expenses against the tortfeasor. Specifically, a typical subrogation
clause provides:
In the event of any payment under this policy, the company
shall be subrogated to all the rights of recovery therefore which
the injured person or anyone receiving such payment may have
against any person or organization and such person shall execute
and deliver instruments and papers and do whatever else is
necessary to secure such rights. Such person shall do nothing
after loss to prejudice such rights.3 19
The validity of such subrogation provisions has been challenged
in a number of cases, resulting in a split in authority regarding an
insurer's right to subrogation. 20 The purpose of this section is to
318 That medical services coverage is indemnity insurance has not gone unquestioned. See e.g., C. BRAINARD, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 244 (1st ed. 1961).
But cf. Katz, supra note 218, at 270; Kircher, Set-Off And Subrogation In
Automobile Medical Payments Coverage, Defense Memo, 7 For The Defense
No. 10 (Dec. 1966).
319 Milwaukee Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. Policy, Condition 13.
320The Insurer's right to subrogation of medical expenses has been judicially
upheld in eighteen jurisdictions: Shipley v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 244
Ark. 1159, 428 S.W2d 268 (1968) ; Higgins v. Allied Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
237 A.2d 471 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co.,
193 So. 2d 224 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966); Bernardini v. Home & Auto. Ins. Co.,
64 I1. App. 2d 465, 212 N.E2d 499 (1965); Michigan Medical Service v.
Sharpe, 339 Mich. 574, 64 N.W.2d 713 (1954) ; National Union Fire Ins. Co.
v. Grimes, 278 Minn. 45, 153 N.W2d 152 (1967); Davenport v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 81 Nev. 361, 404 P.2d 10 (1965); Busch v. Home Ins.
C., 97 N.J. Super. 54, 234 A.2d 250 (1967); Smith v. Motor Club of Am.
Ins. Co., 54 N.J. Super. 37, 148 A.2d 37 (1959); Miller v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 48 Misc. 2d 102, 264 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Special T. 1965); Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 309, 145 S.E2d 845 (1966). Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Lutz, 3 Ohio Misc. 144, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 469, 210 N.E.2d 755 (Akron Mun.
Ct. 1964); Demmery v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 210 Pa. Super. 193,
232 A.2d 21 (1967) ; Hospital Service Corp. of R.I. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co.,
227 A.2d 105 (R.I. 1967) ; Wilson v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 219
Tenn. 560, 411 S.W.2d 699 (1966); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 22 Utah 2d 183, 450 P.2d 458 (1969) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Ritz, 70 Wash. 2d 317, 422 P.2d 780 (1967) ; Associated Hosp. Service, Inc.
v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 170, 147 N.W.2d 225 (1967).
The validity of such a provision has been rejected in five jurisdictions:
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lea, 2 Ariz. App. 538, 410 P.2d 495 (1966);
Peller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 61G, 34 Cal. Rptr. 41
(1963); Wrightsman v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App.
306, 147 S.E.2d 860 (1966); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W,2d
418 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); Lowder v. Oklahoma Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co.,
436 P.2d 654 (Okla. 1967).
One jurisdiction has enacted a statute expressly forbidding the incorporation of a subrogation provision in medical expenses coverage: VA. CODE
ANN. § 38.1-38.12 (1968).
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review these decisions, in order to ascertain the better reasoned rule
3 21
regarding the validity of such provisions.
The question as to an insurer's subrogation rights under a medical
payments subrogation clause in an automobile policy may arise in a
number of ways.'

22

(1) An insurer who has made medical payments pursuant to the
policy may attempt to recover them directly from the tortfeasor ;323
(2) An insurer claiming the right to reimbursement may attempt to
recover the amount paid from the insured after the latter has settled
with or recovered a judgment against the tortfeasor ;324 (3) An
insured may attempt to recover medical payments from an insurer
which refuses to pay them unless and until the insured executes a
formal agreement subrogating the insurer to the proceeds of any recovery which the insured may obtain;335 (4) An insured may bring
an action to recover medical payments from an Insurer which flatly
refuses to make them because the insured has already settled with
and released the tortfeasor and has thereby prejudiced the insured's
subrogation rights ;326 (5) One insurer claiming a right to subrogation may attempt to recover the medical payments made to its insured
from the insurer of the tortfeasor after the first insurer has given
the tortfeasor's insurer notice of its subrogation rights and the tortfeasor's insurer thereafter makes settlement with the insured of the
first insurer ;327 (6) The insured may commence an action seeking a
3 28
declaration that the subrogation clause is void as against public policy.

321 See

Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 1054 (1968), for a discussion of the same topic.
Id. at 1055.
323 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lutz, 3 Ohio Misc. 144, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 469, 210 N.E.2d
322

3

755 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1964); Lowder v. Oklahoma Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co.,
436 P.2d 654 (Okla. 1967).
(1966);
Michigan Medical Service v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 574, 64 N.W.2d 713 (1954) ;
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Grimes, 278 Minn. 45, 153 N.W.2d 152
(1967); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. Ct. App.
1965); Hospital Service Corp. of R.I. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 227 A.2d
105 (R.I. 1967); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ritz, 70 Wash. 2d 317, 422
P.2d 780 (1967).
Peller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 610, 34 Cal. Rptr. 41
(1963) ; Demmery v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 210 Pa. Super. 193, 232
A.2d 21 (1967).
Shipley v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 244 Ark. 1159, 428 S.W.2d 268 (1968);
Higgins v. Allied Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 237 A.2d 471 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968);
DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966)
Wrightsman v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 306, 147
S.E.2d 280 (1966) ; Bernardini v. Home & Auto Ins. Co., 64 Ill. App. 2d 465,
212 N.E.2d 499 (1966); Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 309, 145
S.E.2d 845 (1966); Busch v. Home Ins. Co., 97 N.J. Super. 54, 234 A.2d
250 (1967).
Davenport v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 81 Nev. 361, 404 P2d 10
(1965); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 22 Utah 2d 183,
450 P.2d 458 (1969) ; Associated Hosp. Service, Inc. v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut.
Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 170, 147 N.W.2d 225 (1967).
Miller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 48 Misc. 2d 102, 264 N.Y.S.2d 319

24 Harleysville Mut. Ins Co. v. Lea, 2 Ariz. App. 538, 410 P.2d 495

325

326

327

385
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The minority of courts which deny effect to medical payments
subrogation have based their decisions on arguments that such provisions are void because they either: (1) attempt an assignment of a
cause of action for personal injuries ;329 or (2) constitute the splitting
33 0
of an indivisible cause of action in tort.

In Peller v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 331 the plaintiffs
were injured and incurred medical expenses. The defendant-insurer
refused to pay unless and until each plaintiff assigned to the defendant his right of recovery to the extent of such payments, pursuant to
the insurer's subrogation provision. In an action for declaratory
relief, the plaintiffs alleged that the subrogation provision was invalid,
illegal and against public policy. The court noted that the result of
the provision was to transfer the insured's cause of action against a
third-party tortfeasor to the insurer. Since the state legislature had
codified the common law rule against assignability of causes of action
arising out of personal injuries, the court was compelled to hold the
subrogation clause invalid. The court suggested that such a common
law rule should not apply to subrogation for medical expenses, but
332
decided that any change must be made by the legislature.
In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Chumbley,3' 3 the insured was
injured in an automobile accident. The resulting medical expenses
were paid by the plaintiff-insurer, who then notified a third party tortfeasor of its payment and right to subrogation. Subsequently, the
insured settled all claims with the tortfeasor, in violation of the subrogation provision. The insurer then sued to recover the payment
from its insured, or in the alternative, to recover from the tortfeasor
the amount that the insurer had paid to the insured. The insurer
argued that medical expenses are a special damage, separate and apart
from bodily injury claim and thus subject t subrogation. The court
conceded that such damages were special, but noted that they were
nontheless an integral element of a personal tort. The court consequently held the provision invalid as a prohibited assignment of a claim
arising out of personal injury . The court further reasoned that to

(Special T. 1965); Wilson v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 219 Tenn.
560, 411 S.W.2d 699 (1967).
32 Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lea, 2 Ariz. App. 538, 410 P.2d 495 (1966);
Peller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 610, 34 Cal. Rptr. 41
(1963); Wrightsman v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App.
306, 147 S.E.2d 280 (1966); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d
418 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
330
Lowder v. Oklahoma Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co., 436 P.2d 654 (Okla. 1967).
331220 Cal. App. 2d 610, 34 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1963).
332 A statute prohibiting assignment of claims for personal injuries was also
33

decisive in Wrightsman v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 113 Ga.
App. 306, 147 S.E. 2d 860 (1966).
394 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. Ct App. 1965).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

allow subrogation would invite multiple subrogation claims and promote suits and interpleaders, all contrary to the policy of the law.334
Lowder v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 33 5 was

an action by an insurer to recover from a tortfeasor for medical
expenses paid to its insured. The court noted that in Oklahoma a
single tort to a single person gives rise to but a single action, however numerous the resulting items of damage may be. Thus a separate action by an insurer to recover only medical expenses controverted
the rule against splitting a cause of action and was barred. The court
reasoned that the prevention of a multiplicity of suits and of vexatious
litigation outweighed the arguments for subrogation.
The majority of courts have found the medical payments subrogation provision valid and enforceable for one or more of the
following reasons:
(1) A claim for personal injuries may be assigned ;336 (2) Medical payments subrogation merely impresses a lien in favor of the
insurer (to the extent of its payment upon the proceeds of any
recovery obtained by the insured from the tortfeasor ;337 (3) Such
right is based on contract, is not unfair or overreaching, and is accompanied by an appropriately reduced premium ;338 (4) Such provision
is not contrary to public policy in the absence of action by the
insurance department, which is vested by the legislature with duties
concerning the form of insurance policies ;339 and (5) The provision
merely provides for conventional subrogation and does not constitute
an assignment.

34 0

See also Harleysville Mut. Ins Co. v. Lea, 2 Ariz. App. 538, 410 P.2d 495
(1966).
35 436 P.2d 654 (Okla. 1967).
338 Davenport v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 81 Nev. 361, 404 P.2d 10
(1965); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lutz, 3 Ohio Misc. 144, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 469,
210 N.E.2d 755 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1964).
337
Bernardini v. Home & Auto Ins. Co., 64 Ill. App. 2d 465, 212 N.E.2d 499
(1966); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Grimes, 278 Minn. 45, 153 N.W.2d
152 (1967); Miller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 48 Misc. 2d 102, 264
N.Y.S.2d 319 (Special T. 1965) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ritz, 70 Wash.
2d 317, 422 P.2d 780 (1967).
338 Michigan Medical Service v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 574, 64 N.W2d 713 (1954);
Hospital Service Corp. of R.I. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105 (R.I.
1967) ; Associated Hosp. Service, Inc. v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 33
339 Wis. 2d 170, 147 N.W.2d 225 (1967).
Bernardini v. Home & Auto. Ins. Co., 64 Ill. App. 2d 465, 212, N.E.2d 499
(1966); Busch v. Home Ins. Co., 97 N.J. Super. 54, 234 A.2d 250 (1967);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lutz, 3 Ohio Misc. 144, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 469, 210
N.E.2d 755 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1964).
340 Shipley v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 244 Ark. 1159, 428 S.W.2d 268
(1968); Higgins v. Allied Am. Fire Ins. Co., 237 A.2d 471 (D.C. Ct. App.
1968) ; DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224 (Fla. Ct. App.
1966); Busch v. Home Ins. Co., 97 N.J. Super. 54, 234 A.2d 250 (1967);
Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 309, 145 S.E.2d 845 (1966); Demmery v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 210 Pa. Super. 193, 232 A2d 21
(1967); Wilson v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 219 Tenn. 560, 411
S.W.2d 699 (1967); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 22
Utah 2d 183, 450 P.2d 458 (1969).
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a
In Hospital Services Corp. v. Pennsylvania Insurance Co.,
subscriber to a Blue Cross hospitalization policy was injured as a
result of the negligence of a third party. Blue Cross paid her hospital
bills pursuant to its contract and then notified the tortfeasor and her
insurer. Thereafter the tortfeasor and her insurer entered into a
settlement with the injured party of all her claims. The demand of
Blue Cross was not honored. It commenced an action joining the
tortfeasor, her insurer, and the injured subscriber as defendants. The
court held that Blue Cross was entitled to subrogation under its contract. It concluded that the clause differed from an assignment. The
court further stated that such a contract tends to reduce premiums
and fosters a type of coverage that provides protection for the insured
3 42
without creating a windfall.
34 3
In Davenport v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
State Farm brought an action against Allstate and its insured to
recover a sum paid out under its medical payments provision. State
Farm had given Allstate, the tortfeasor's insurer, notice of its payment
and subrogation rights. Thereafter Allstate settled with State Farm's
insured for all claims. The court upheld the plaintiff's action for
subrogation. It held that the assignability of the right to sue in tort
for personal injuries was governed by the test of survivorship. That
is, if the right of action survived the death of the injured person,
the right was assignable. Since a right to sue in tort survives in
Nevada, subrogation to proceeds of a personal injury recovery was
344
permissible.
34 5
In Bernardiniv. Home & Automobile Insurance Co., the plaintiffinsured was involved in an automobile accident and incurred medical
expenses as a result. The defendant-insurer's policy contained a
subrogation clause. The plaintiff effected a settlement with the tortfeasor's insurer and executed a release in its favor. The defendant
refused to pay the plaintiff's medical bills, claiming that the plaintiff
had prejudiced its subrogation rights. The plaintiff contended the
subrogation clause was an assignment of a personal injury claim and
therefore void. The court held that there was no attempted assignment, since subrogation operates only to secure contribution and
indemnity, whereas an assignment transfers the whole claim. The
841

227 A.2d 105 (RI. 1967).

For other cases decided under group medical and hospitalization policies and
upholding the validity of subrogation, see Michigan Medical Service v.
Sharpe, 339 Mich. 574, 64 N.W.2d 713 (1954); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Ritz, 70 Wash. 2d 317, 422 P2d 780 (1967); Associated Hosp. Service,
Inc. v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 170, 147 N.W.2d 225
(1967).
343 81 Nev. 361, 404 P2d 10 (1965).
344 For the view that claims for personal injury are assignable, see also Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Lutz, 3 Ohio Misc. 144, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 469, 210 N.E.2d 755
(Akron Mun. Ct. 1964).
845 64 Ill. App. 2d 465, 212 N.E.2d 499 (1960).
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court concluded that a medical payments subrogation clause merely
impresses a lien in favor of the insurer to the extent of its payment
upon any recovery obtained from the tortfeasor. 34"
In DeCespedes v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Co., 34 7 the issue was

whether an insured was entitled to a recovery under the medical payments provision of an automobile policy containing a subrogation
clause. He had settled his claim against a third party tortfeasor and
executed a full release. The court, in denying recovery and upholding
the insurer's right to subrogation, stated:
Under the doctrine of subrogation the insurer is substituted,
by operation of law, to the rights of the insured ....

It is not

available to a volunteer, only to one under a duty to pay.
Furthermore, it is not available to an extent greater than the
amount paid by the insurer, and then only after the insured has
been fully indemnified. By contrast, an assignment generally
refers to or connotes a voluntary act of transferring an interest ....
Subrogation serves to limit the chance of double recovery or
windfall to the insured, and, when exercised, tends to place the
primary liability upon the tortfeasor, where it belongs ....
So long as subrogation, as applied to this medical pay
346 provision
serves to bar double recovery, it should be upheld.
The court thus distinguished subrogation of medical payments from
49
assignment of a tort action.3
It is apparent after a review of decisions bearing on the subject,
that subrogation provisions in medical payments coverage should be
recognized as valid contractual agreements. It is no defense to
such a procvision that it amounts to an assignment of a claim for personal injuries:
Subrogation, however, differs materially from an assignment.
Subrogation is the act of the law, depending . . . upon the principles of equity, while assignment . . . depends generally on

intention. So also subrogation presupposes an actual payment
and satisfaction of the debt or claim to which the party is subThis view was also expressed in: National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Grimes,
278 Minn. 45, 153 N.W.2d 152 (1967); Miller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
48 Misc. 2d 102, 264 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Special T. 1965) ; and Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Ritz, 70 Wash. 2d 317, 422 P.2d 780 (1967). But note that in
Grimes the court upheld the provision only as between the insurer and its
insured, reserving ruling on the validity of such a clause if asserted against
a third party tortfeasor.
347 193 So. 2d 224 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966).
348 Id. at 227 (citations omitted).
3 9
4 See also, Shipley v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 244 Ark. 1159, 428 S.W.2d
268 (1968); Higgins v. Allied Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 237 A.2d 471 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1968); Busch v. Home Ins. Co., 97 N.J. Super. 54, 234 A.2d 250
(1967) ; Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 309, 145 S.E.2d 845 (1966) ;
Demmery v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 210 Pa. Super. 193, 232 A.2d
21 (1967); Wilson v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 219 Tenn. 560, 411
S.W.2d 699 (1967); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 22
Utah 2d 183, 450 P.2d 458 (1969).
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rogated, although the remedy is kept alive in equity for the
benefit of the one who made the payment under circumstances
entitling him to contribution or indemnity, while assignment
necessarily contemplates the continued existence of the debt
or claim assigned. Subrogation operates only to secure contribution and
indemnity, where as assignment transfers the
3 50
whole claim.
The validity of such a provision should be based on the rudimentary
concept of subrogation:
[S]ubrogation is a creature of equity having for its purpose
the working out of an equitable adjustment between the parties
by securing the ultimate discharge of the debt by the person
who in equity and good conscience ought to pay it.351
[A] wrongdoer who is legally responsible for the harm should
not receive the windfall of being absolved from liability because
the insured had had the foresight to obtain, and had paid the
expense of procuring, insurance for his protection; since the
insured has already been paid for his harm, the liability of the
352
third person should now inure for the benefit of the insurer.
It should be noted that although a court recognizes the validity
of a medical payments subrogation provision, it may declare the
insurer estopped from asserting it against its insured. In Silinsky v.
State-Wide Insurance Co., 358 the court held that an insured under
an automobile liability policy was entitled to reimbursement of her
medical expenses, although she had given a general release to the
tortfeasor and although there was a subrogation provision in the policy.
The insurer's delay of ten months in paying plaintiff combined with
its failure to ascertain the facts of her settlement prevented the insurer
from asserting any defenses.
In at least one state in which direct action against a third party
tortfeasor by means of subrogation is denied, a reimbursement agreement in an automobile policy with respect to medical payments
coverage has been upheld, despite a statutory prohibition against
assignment of a claim for personal injuries.3 54 Under such an agreement, the insurer obligates itself to advance medical payments within
policy limits. However, its ultimate liability for the loss becomes
fixed only in the event that the injured insured is unable to recover
such expenditures from the third party tortfeasor. In Tryper v. Meritplan Insurance Co., 38 5 the court held:
350 6 C.J.S. Assignments § 2(b), at 1051 (1937).
351 16 G. CoucH, CycloPEIA OF INsURANCE LAw § 61:18 (2d ed. 1966).
352

Id.

353
30 App. Div. 2d 1, 289 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1968).
3 54
Tryper v. Meritplan Ins. Co., Los Angeles County Super. Ct., App. Dep't

[Civ. No. A 11085] (1965) [P., F. & M. Analysis Service, Current Court
Decisions (The Rough Notes Co., Feb., 1966)].
355 Id.
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With the growth of insurance coverage and the increasing cost
of automobile insurance . . . possibilities of double recovery ...
may constitute inequities against good conscience to which this
court should not shut its eyes.
We see no good reason why an insured desiring to obtain and
an insurer desiring to sell (both in good faith) insurance upon
as low a premium as possible, may not enter into a contract
that permits [reimbursement].
One ought to seek to be made whole, but not enriched through
an automobile accident which happens too frequently in the
milieu of modern life.
The considerations mentioned by the court point up the equities
attendant upon an insurer's right to subrogation when a third party
tortfeasor has caused injury to its insured.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to analyze all of the litigated points
of dispute that have developed from the medical payments provision
of the automobile liability policy since that provision's emergence
thirty years ago. The coverage over these years has been gradually
expanded. A much more spectacular expansion in the use of first
party medical pay and first party coverage is being proposed today.
This will include all areas of economic loss but any expansion must
be viewed in light of the considerable judicial experience with firstparty insurance.
Some questions which have arisen have not been easily solved;
some still appear very difficult; others appear insoluble. The difficulties of yesterday may predict the obstacles of tomorrow. Medical
payments coverage can be complicated and change must contemplate
the legal problem which this coverage has presented to countless
claimants. Therefore the collection and analysis of this judicial precedent should be helpful in the interpretation and solution of issues
created by the current medical payments coverage but most importantly will serve as a guide for charting expanding first-party economic
loss coverage in the future.
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APPENDIX

SAMPLE POLICY A
Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Company
Personal Automobile Policy
PART 11-EXPENSES FOR MEDICAL SERVICES
Coverage C-Medical Services. To pay all reasonable expenses incurred within one
year from the date of accident for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray and dental
services, including prosthetic devices, and necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nursing and funeral services:
Division 1. To or for the named insured and each relative who sustains bodily
-injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter called
"bodily injury", caused by accident,
(a)while occupying the owned automobile,
(b)while occupying a non-owned automobile, but only if 'such person has the
permission of the owner to use the automobile and the use is within the scope
of iuch permission, or
(c) through being struck by an automobile,
Division 2. To or for any other person who sustains bodily injury, caused by
accident, while occupying
(a) the owned automobile, while being used by the named insured or by any other
person with the permission of the named insured; or
(b)a non-owned automobile, if the bodily injury results from its operation or
occupancy by the named insured or its operation on his behalf by his private
chauffeur or domestic servant but only if such operator or occupant has the
permission of the owner to use the automobile and the use is within the
scope of such permission;
provided that no such payment shall be made under Division 1 or Division 2 unless
the person to or for whom such payment is made shall have executed a written
agreement that the amount of such payment shall be applied toward the settlement
of any claim, or the satisfaction of any judgment for damages entered in his favor,
against any insured because of bodily injury arising out of any accident to which
the Liability Coverage applies.
Definitions. The definitions under Part I apply to Part II,and under Part I:
"occupying" means in or upon or entering into or alighting from;
"an automobile" includes a trailer of any type.
Exclusions. This policy does not apply under Part IH:
(a)to bodily injury sustained while occupying (1) an owned automobile while used
as a public or livery conveyance, or (2)any vehicle while located for use as a
residence or premises;
(b) to bodily injury sustained by the named insured or a relative while occupying
or through being struck by (1)a farm type tractor or other equipment designed.
for use principally off public roads, while not upon public roads, or (2) a
vehicle operated on rails or crawler-treads;
(c) to bodily injury sustained by any person other than the named insured or a
relative, (1)while such person is occupying a non-owned automobile while used
as a public or livery conveyance, or (2) resulting from the maintenance or use
of a non-owned automobile by such person while employed or otherwise engaged
in the automobile business, or (3) resulting from the maintenance or use of a
non-owned automobile by such person while employed or otherwise engaged in
any other business or occupation, unless the bodily injury results from the
operation or occupancy of a private passenger automobile by the named insured
or by his private chauffeur or domestic servant, or of a trailer used therewith
or with an owned automobile;
(d) to bodily injury sustained by any person who is employed in the automobile
business, if the accident arises out of the operation thereof and if benefits
therefor are in whole or in part either payable or required to be provided under
any workmen's compensation law;
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(e) to bodily injury due to war;
(f) to bodily injury sustained while occupying any vehicle which is designed or
equipped for so-called "hot rod" or "stock car" racing either while so operated
or while being tested, repaired or serviced; or while occupying any vehicle in
an organized race or contest;
(g) to that amount of any expense for medical services which is paid or payable to
or for the injured person under the provisions of any (1) premises insurance
affording benefits for medical expenses, (2) individual, blanket or group accident, disability or hospitalization insurance, (3) medical, surgical, hospital or
funeral service, benefit or reimbursement plan or (4) workmen's compensation
or disability benefits law or any similar law.
Limit of Liability. The limit of liability for medical services stated in the declarations as applicable to "each person" is the limit of the company's liability for
all expenses incurred by or on behalf of each person who sustains bodily injury
as the result of any one accident.
Other Insurance. If the insured has other automobile insurance affording the
benefits for medical expenses against a loss covered by Part 11of this policy the
company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater proportion of such
loss than the applicable limit of liability stated in the declarations bears to the
total applicable limit of liability of all valid and collectible automobile medical
services insurance; provided, however, the insurance with respect to a temporary
substitute automobile or non-owned automobile shall be excess insurance over any
other valid and collectible automobile medical services insurance.
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SAMPLE POLICY B
Northwestern National Insurance Company
Family Combination Automobile Policy
PART II- EXPENSES FOR MEDICAL SERVICES
Coverage C-Medical Payments: To pay all reasonable expenses.incurred within one year from
the date of accident for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray and dental services, including pros-*
thetic devices, and necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nursing and funeral services:
Division 1. To or for the named insured and each relative who sustains bodily injury, sickness
or disease, -including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter called "bodily injury", caused by
accident,
(a)while occupying the owned automobile,
(b)while occupying a non-owned automobile, but only if such person has, or reasonably believes he has, the permission of the owner to use the automobile and the use is within the
scope of such permission, or
(c)
through being struck by an automobile or by a trailer of any type;
Division 2. To or for any other person who sustains bodily injury, caused by accident, while
occupying
(a)the owned automobile, while being used by the named insured, by any resident of the same
household or by any other person with the permission of the named insured; or
(b)anon-owned automobile, if the bodily injury results from
its operation or occupancy by the named insured or its operation on his behalf by his
(I)
private chauffeur or domestic servant, or
(2)its operation or occupancy by a relative, provided it is a private passenger automobile
or trailer,
but only if such operator or occupant has, or reasonably believes he has, the permission of
the owner to use the automobile and the use iswithin the scope of such permission.
definitions under Part I apply to Part II,and under Part IH:
Definitions:
"occupying" The
means inor upon or entering into or alighting from.
Exclusions: This policy does not apply under Part I to bodily injury:
(a)sustained while occupying (1)an owned automobile while used as a public or livery conveyance, or (2)any vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises;
(b)sustained by the named insured or a relative while occupying or through being struck by
(1)
a farm type tractor or other equipment designed for use principally off public roads,
while not upon public roads, or (2)a vehicle operated on rails or crawler-treads;
(c)
sustained by any person other than the named insured or a relative,
(1)while such person isoccupying a non-owned automobile while used as a public or livery
conveyance, or
(2)resulting from the maintenance or use of a non-owned automobile by such person while
employed or otherwise engaged inthe automobile business, or
(3)resulting from the maintenance or use of a non-owned automobile by such person while
employed or otherwise engaged inany other business or occupation, unless the bodily
injury results from the operation or occupancy of aprivate passenger automobile by the
named insured or by his private chauffeur or domestic servant, or of a trailer used
therewith or with an owned automobile;
(d)sustained by any person who is employed inthe automobile business, if the accident arises
out of the operation thereof and if benefits therefor are inwhole or inpart either payable
or required to be provided under any workmen's compensation law;
(e)
due to war.
Limit of Liability: The limit of liability for medical payments stated in the declarations as applicable to "each person" isthe limit of the company's liability for all expenses incurred by or
on behalf of each person who sustains bodily injury as the result of any one accident.
Other Insurance: If there isother automobile medical payments insurance against a loss covered by Part IIof this policy the company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater
proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of liability stated inthe declarations bears to
the total applicable limit of liability of all valid and collectible automobile medical payments
insurance; provided, hiowever, the insurance with respect to a temporary substitute automobile
or non-owned automobile shall be excess insurance over any other valid and collectible automobile medical payments insurance.

